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V 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN.§ 78A-4-103(2)G). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Does Rindlesbach have standing to challenge the Trustee's and the Hardy 
Party's motion to reverse and remand the trial court's entry of summary judgment in 
Rindlesbach' s favor? 
2. Is this appeal moot where the Plaintiffs/ Appellants (the "Lenders") seek 
reversal of the trial court's dismissal of their claims against Mark L. Rindlesbach 
("Rindlesbach") individually and where the Lenders have already received a judgment 
against the Rindlesbach Construction, Inc. Profit Sharing Plan (the ''Plan") for the full 
relief pleaded by the Lenders? 
3. Should this Court reverse the district court based on the stipulation of the 
Lenders and the Trustee ofRindlesbach's Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Estate (the "Trustee")? 
4. Under Utah law, is Rindlesbach personally liable for a guaranty signed in 
his capacity as trustee of the Plan? 
The District Court below decided the question of Rindlesbach's personal liability 
on Rindlesbach's Motion for Summary Judgment. This Court reviews the "'trial court's 
legal conclusions and ultimate grant or denial of summary judgment for correctness."' 
DePacto, Inc. v. Teton View Golf Estates, LLC, 2014 UT App 266, ,r 6,339 P.3d 126 
(quoting Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, ,r 6, 177 P.3d 600). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature, Course, and Disposition of Proceedings 
The Plan, along with others, guaranteed a $3,300,000 loan (the "Guaranty") made 
by the Lenders to a third party borrower. The borrower failed to pay back the loan and 
the lenders brought suit on the Guaranty. The Lenders initially pleaded breach of the 
Guaranty against the Plan not Rindlesbach individually. The Lenders subsequently 
amended their complaint and, in a single, footnote reference to Rindlesbach individually, 
stated that if the Plan proved to not be liable on the Guaranty, Rindlesbach should be 
individually liable. 
All the guarantors except the Plan and Rindlesbach filed bankruptcy and received 
a discharge before trial. Also prior to trial, Rindlesbach successfully moved for summary 
judgment on the alternative claim against him, leaving the Plan the only defendant at the 
time of trial. A jury trial was held from August 6, 2012 to August 11, 2102, and ajury 
verdict was entered in favor of the Lenders. 1 Judgment was entered against the Plan on 
December 3, 2012.2 The Lenders now seek reversal of the trial court's summary 
judgment ruling dismissing Rindlesbach individually. 
Statement of Facts 
1. In May 2007, the Lenders, a group of twelve hard money lenders, made a 
$3,300,000 loan to a borrower, Eagle Mountain Lots, LLC, to facilitate the purchase of 
1 R. 7275 (Special Verdict). 
2 R. 8106-8109. 
2 
160 acres of land in Eagle Mountain, Utah. 3 
2. The Plan, along with eight other guarantors, guaranteed the $3,300,000 loan 
made by the Lenders to Eagle Mountain Lots, LLC.4 
3. The Guaranty does not name Rindlesbach individually as a guarantor, and 
Rindlesbach did not sign the Guaranty in his individual capacity. 5 
4. The Guaranty's signature block listed "Mark Rindlesbach" as a signatory, 
however, Rindlesbach manually crossed out his name and wrote "Rindlesbach 
Construction, Inc. Profit Sharing Plan by Mark L. Rindlesbach Trustee."6 
(R. 203). 
5. The borrower, Eagle Mountain Lots, LLC, failed to pay back the loan and 
the Lenders brought this action against all the guarantors seeking to recover on the 
Guaranty. 
6. The Lenders' initial complaint did not name Rindlesbach individually as a 
defendant. 7 
3 R. I 058-1065 (Second Amended Complaint at ,r,r 1, 4, 8, 16). 
4 See, e.g. R. 1058-1065 (Second Amended Complaint) (listing guarantors). 
5 R. I 093-1096 (Guaranty). 
6 R. 1096 (Guaranty). 
7 R. 1-3 (Complaint). 
3 
7. However, the Lenders named Rindlesbach as a defendant in their Second 
Amended Complaint, which was the operative complaint at the time oftrial.8 
8. The Second Amended Complaint refers to Rindlesbach in a single footnote, 
which reads: 
With respect to the [Plan], Plaintiffs seek judgment against 
[Rindlesbach] in his capacity as Trustee of such Plan. In the 
event that the Court should determine that his execution of 
the Guaranty is not binding on the Plan for any reason, 
Plaintiffs seek judgment against [Rindlesbach] personally. 9 
9. Rindlesbach moved for summary judgment (the ''Rindlesbach MSJ'') and 
argued that he could not be liable under the Guaranty because he did not sign the 
Guaranty in his individual capacity. 10 
10. The Lenders opposed the Rindlesbach MSJ and argued, inter alia, that (1) 
either the Plan or Rindlesbach must be liable on the Guaranty; (2) and if the Plan proved 
to not be liable, Rindlesbach individually was liable. 11 The Lenders relied specifically on 
the Utah Uniform Trust Code (the "Utah Trust Code"), Utah Code Ann. Section 75-7-
1010( 1) to support their argument. 12 
11. Thereafter, with the trial court's leave, the parties filed supplemental briefs, 
specifically addressing whether the Utah Trust Code applies in this case. 
8 R. 1058, 1063 (Second Amended Complaint, Caption & n.l). 
9 R. 1063 (Second Amended Complaint n. l ). 
10 R. 1955-1964 (Motion for Summary Judgment and supporting memorandum). 
11 R. 2333-2341 (Memorandum in Opposition to Mark L. Rindlesbach 's Motion for 
Summary Judgment). 
12 R. 2338-2340 (Memorandum in Opposition to Mark L. Rindlesbach 's Motion for 
Summary Judgment at 6-8). 
4 
12. Rindlesbach took the position that the Plan did not meet the definition of 
"Trust" under the Utah Trust Code, which specifically excludes trusts "for the primary 
purpose of paying ... salaries, wages, profits, pensions, or employee benefits of any 
kind." 13 
13. Rindlesbach also argued that ERISA and federal case law, not Utah law, 
governed Rindlesbach' s individual liability ( or lack thereof) for contracts signed in his 
capacity as a Plan trustee. 14 
14. The Lenders' initial supplemental brief argued that the Utah Trust Code 
applies. 15 However, the Lenders' apparently backed off of this view in response to 
Rindlesbach's ERISA argument. I6 ERISA case law showed that similar statutes had been 
preempted by federal ERJSA law. 17 
13 R. 3579 (Supplemental Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendant Mark L. 
Rindlesbach's Motion for Summary Judgment); R. 3911-3221 (Memorandum in 
Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike Federal Pre-emption Argument and Alternative 
Motion for Leave to Submit Memorandum in Response to Pre-emption Argument) 
14 R. 3580) (Supplemental Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendant Mark L. 
Rindlesbach's Motion for Summary Judgment). 
15 R. 3691-3697 (Plaintiffs Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to Mark L. 
Rindlesbach's Motion for Summary Judgment); R. 3712-3719 (Motion to Strike Federal 
Pre-emption Argument and Alternative Motion for Leave to Submit Memorandum in 
Response to Pre-emption Argument and supporting memorandum) 
16 R. 3718 (Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike Federal Pre-emption Argument 
and Alternative Motion for Leave to Submit Memorandum in Response to Pre-emption 
Argument at 4 n. l). 
17 R. 4113 (Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendant Mark L. Rindlesbach's Motion 
for Leave to Amend Answer). 
5 
15. The Lenders strenuously opposed Rindlesbach's ERISA pre-emption 
argument. 18 
16. The trial court did not resolve the ERJSA pre-emption issue in its 
memorandum decision on the Rindlesbach MSJ (the "Memorandum Decision"). 19 The 
Memorandum Decision is attached to the Addendum as Exhibit 1 (R. 4269-4276). 
17. The trial court concluded that Rindlesbach could not be individually liable 
because he signed the Guaranty in his capacity as Plan trustee. 20 
18. All the guarantor defendants except Rindlesbach and the Plan filed 
bankruptcy, their liability was discharged, and they were dismissed from the case prior to 
trial.21 
19. Summary judgment in Rindlesbach's favor meant that the Plan was the sole 
remaining defendant at the time of trial. 22 
20. A jury trial was held on August 6, 2012 -August 11, 2012 against the sole 
remaining defendant-the Profit Sharing Plan. 23 
18 R. 3946-3953 (Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike Federal Pre-
emption Argument and Alternative Motion for Leave to Submit Memorandum in 
Response to Pre-emption Argument) 
19 R. 4270 (Memorandum Decision at 2 n.5). 
20 R. 4272 (Memorandum Decision at 4). 
21 R. 7098 (Preliminary Instruction No. 13) (instructing the jury that all of the other 
defendants had filed bankruptcy and received a discharge). 
22 R. 7098 (Preliminary Instruction No. 13). 
23 R. 7090-7091, 7101-7106, 7167-7168 (Jury Trial Minutes). 
6 
Q 
21. On August 11, 2012, the jury entered a special verdict against the Profit 
Sharing Plan, finding that the Plan owed the Hardy Lenders $5,317,800, plus reasonable 
attorney fees, under the guarantee.24 
22. On December 3, 2012, the Court entered judgment (the "Judgment") in 
favor of the Hardy Lenders against the Profit Sharing Plan in the amount of 
$6,367,203 .64.25 
23. The trial court entered its Order of Dismissal as to Mark Lee Rindlesbach 
Individually on December 4, 2014.26 
24. The Lenders took action immediately to discover and collect on the assets 
of the Plan through: 
a. Supplemental proceedings, depositions, and other discovery aimed 
at Rindlesbach as Plan trustee;27 
b. Subpoenas and depositions requesting documents and information 
from third-parties (including Rindlesbach individually and Rindlesbach's wife, 
Brenda Rindlesbach) concerning the Plan;28 
24 R. 7275 (Special Verdict). 
25 R .. 8106-8109. 
26 R. 8115-8117. 
27 R. 8150-51 (Notice of Supplemental Hearing, dated December 12, 2012); R. 8484-85 
(Notice of Deposition of Mark Lee Rindlesbach, Trustee of the Rindlesbach Construction 
Inc. Profit Sharing Plan, dated January 22, 2013); R.8488-89 (Notice of Supplemental 
Hearing, dated January 22, 2013); R. 8608-32 (Amended and Supplemental Responses to 
Interrogatories to Judgment Debtor). 
28 R. 8158-61 (Subpoena Duces Tecum to Central Bank, dated December 7, 2012); R. 
8167-70 (Subpoena Duces Tecum to Guardian Title Company of Utah, dated December 
7, 2012); R. 8249-50 (Notice of Deposition and Notice of Subpoenas Duces Tecum to 
7 
c. Garnishment of the Plan's assets held by banks and other third 
parties (including Rindlesbach individually);29 and a 
d. Writ of Execution issued on July 16, 2013. 30 
25. The Lenders also pursued fraudulent transfer actions to collect from third 
parties money or assets the Lenders alleged the third parties received from the Plan. 31 
26. The Lenders filed the instant appeal on April 26, 2013. The Lenders 
sought, among other things, reversal of certain conclusions of law relevant to its claims 
against the Plan and reversal of the trial court's summary judgment ruling and subsequent 
dismissal of Rindlesbach individually. 32 
27. On September 13, 2013, Rindlesbach filed for personal bankruptcy under 
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, which caused an automatic stay to go into effect on 
all collections efforts (including against Mr. Rindlesbach as trustee of the Profit Sharing 
Plan).33 
Tim Krueger, dated December 7, 2012); R. 8329-33 (Subpoena Duces Tecum to Mark 
Lee Rindlesbach, dated December 21, 2012); R. 8546-50 (Subpoena Duces Tecum to 
Brenda N. Rindlesbach, dated December 21, 2012). 
29 R. 8353-56 (Application for Writ of Garnishment, dated December 21, 2012); R. 
9170-73 (Application for Writ of Garnishment, dated February 15, 2013 (seeking 
garnishment of funds held by Rindlesbach individually)). 
30 R. 9697-9698. 
31 R. 8733 (Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Mandatory Injunction and in 
Support of Expedited Motion to Dissolve Temporary Restraining Order (describing 
fraudulent transfer actions commenced)); R. 8745-8752 (Complaint). 
32 R. 9537-39 (Notice of Appeal). 
33 R. 9734-9738. 
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28. On November 27, 2013, the Hardy Lenders obtained relief from the 
automatic stay to continue to pursue plan assets.34 
29. On December 11, 2013, the Lenders filed a Second Application for Writ of 
Execution to execute on all of the Plan's property in satisfaction of the Judgment. The 
Court issued the requested Writ the same day. 35 
30. Rindlesbach's bankruptcy was converted to a Chapter 7 case on January 13, 
2014, and Philip G. Jones became the Chapter 7 trustee (the "Trustee"). 
31. As the Lenders' efforts to collect against the Plan continued, the Trustee 
reached a settlement with Rindlesbach's primary creditors, including the Lenders (the 
"Settlement"). 
32. The Settlement contained the following terms, among others: 
a. Notwithstanding the trial court's summary judgment and subsequent 
dismissal in Rindlesbach 's favor, the Lenders would receive a claim against the 
bankruptcy estate; 
b. The Trustee stipulated that this Court would reverse the trial court's 
summary judgment in favor ofRindlesbach and remand the case to the district 
court for entry of a post-discharge judgment in the amount of $4 million against 
Rindlesbach individually. 
See Settlement Agreement, attached as Exhibit 2 to Addendum. 
34 R. 9854-9857 (Order Modifying Automatic Stay). 
35 R. 9861-67. 
9 
33. The Bankruptcy Court approved the Settlement but expressed misgivings 
about claims asserted against Rindlesbach after his anticipated discharge in bankruptcy. 
The Trustee reassured the Bankruptcy Court that no claims would be brought against 
Rindlesbach in violation of his discharge. The following exchange between the 
Bankruptcy Court and the Trustee took place at the hearing to approve the Settlement in 
July 2014: 
Court: 
Counsel for 
Trustee: 
Court: 
Counsel for 
Trustee: 
[s]o, Mr. Toscano [Rindlesbach's bankruptcy 
counsel], I'm speaking for your benefit. I 
know some of the concerns you have are about 
what's going on here is, "[H]ow is this going 
to impact my client after this? 
As I view it, the Hardy parties have no -
assuming Mr. Rindlesbach gets a discharge -
the trustee doesn't file a 727 or the Trustee 
does and doesn't prevail - the Hardy parties 
have no claim against [Rindlesbach], and-
Have a claim, it would be discharged. 
Correct. 
The settlement's approved. 
I agree with that. If the settlement's approved, 
then he gets a general discharge, the Hardy 
Parties cannot for example, file a 523 action at 
this point. They are - that claim is barred. So I 
want to make sure you understand that's what 
I believe has happened in this case thus far, 
and that might address some of your concerns 
about what the heck is going on here and 
what's going to happen if this settlement is 
approved. 
10 
See Hearing Transcript before the Honorable Judge Joel T. Marker, United States 
Bankruptcy Court, July 2, 2014, p. 8:8-25-9:5 ("July 2 Hearing Trans."), attached to 
Addendum as Exhibit 3. 36 The Trustee also stated what it intended with the discharge to 
be entered after the Settlement: 
Counsel for 
Trustee: 
So the trustee's belief is that - assume that 
- for a moment the trustee does not file a 
727 cause of against [Rindlesbach] which 
is entirely possible. If that's the case 
[Rindlesbach] would receive a general 
discharge. If the Court approves the 
settlement in that fact scenario, 
[Rindlesbach] would have the obligation 
that the Trustee had agreed to, but that 
obligation would be discharged, and so 
action could not be taken, obviously, in 
violation of the discharge injunction. 
July 2 Hearing Trans., p. 10:12-22, attached to Addendum as Exhibit 3. 
34. The Bankruptcy Court also made clear that, even though it approved the 
settlement stipulating to this Court's reversal of the trial court's summary judgment 
ruling, it was not requiring this Court to take action one way or the other. 
3 5. The Lenders informed this Court of the Settlement in a "Status Report" 
filed on June 3, 2014. 
36. On July 28, 2014, the Court dismissed this action (the "2014 Dismissaf') 
on the assumption that the Settlement had been approved. 
36 In accordance with this Court's Order dated March 23, 2015, this Court may take 
judicial notice of the Transcript from the Bankruptcy Court. 
11 
3 7. On August 1, 2014, the Bankruptcy Court granted Rindlesbach a discharge 
under Section 272 of Title 11, United States Code. A copy of the Notice of Discharge is 
attached to the Addendum as Exhibit 4. 
38. Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 524, the discharge operates as an injunction against 
the commencement or continuation of an action against Rindlesbach to collect or recover 
any debt as a personal liability of Rindlesbach. 
39. Nevertheless, the Lenders sought to reinstate this Appeal in the wake of the 
2014 Dismissal. 
40. On August 21, 2014, the Court reinstated the Lenders' appeal with respect 
to the Hardy Lenders' claims against the Plan. However, with respect to Rindlesbach 
individually, the Court held: "[B]ased on Mark L. Rindlesbach's Notice of Bankruptcy 
Discharge, no claims may be hereafter pursued in this appeal against Mark Lee 
Rindlesbach, in his individual capacity." See Order, dated August 21, 2014 (on file with 
the Court) (the "August 21, 2014 Order"). 
41. The Court reaffirmed this view in an order dated September 29, 2014 (on 
file with the Court) (the "September 29, 2014 Order"). 
42. The September 29, 2014 Order also granted the Trustee's motion to 
substitute for Rindlesbach as a party to this appeal. However, the Court noted that "[t]he 
Bankruptcy Court's order expressly indicates that it is not ordering any State Court to 
take any specific action." 
43. On September 30, 2014, the Lenders moved this Court for summary 
reversal of the trial court's summary judgment ruling in Rindlesbach's favor. 
12 
44. The Court denied the motion on November 6, 2014, favoring a plenary 
review of this appeal. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
This appeal is moot. The Lenders have already received a judgment against the 
Plan for the full amount pleaded. There is no basis in Utah law for a judgment against 
both the Plan and Rindlesbach for a contract that Rindlesbach did not sign in his 
individual capacity. Such a judgment exceeds even the relief sought by the Lenders 
where the Lenders clearly pleaded their claims against Rindlesbach in the alternative. 
Even if the Court reverses the trial court's summary judgment ruling and dismissal of 
Rindlesbach individually, the trial court on remand could not properly enter judgment 
against Rindlesbach. Entry of judgment against Rindlesbach individually would result in 
a duplicate judgment and windfall for the Lenders. It would also violate Rindlesbach's 
bankruptcy discharge. 
Further, the Settlement does not provide a basis for reversal. The Bankruptcy 
Court made clear that it could not and would not bind this Court to reverse the summary 
judgment in favor of Rindlesbach. Further, the Trustee cannot waive Rindlesbach' s 
defenses to individual liability. As such, the Settlement is irrelevant. 
Finally, the trial court properly held that a trustee signing in his or her 
representative capacity is not individually liable for a contract between the trust and a 
third party. The Lenders' argument is based on an ancient common law rule that no 
longer reflects the law's view on trustee and entity liability. Rather, it is a throw-back to 
a time when a trustee could not bind a trust to contacts with third parties. Obviously, 
13 
even if this rule was good law (which it is not), it does not apply here where the Lenders 
have already taken a judgment against the trust and have been collecting directly against 
trust assets for more than two years. 
ARGUMENT 
A. Mark L. Rindlesbach Has Standing to Object to the Entering of Any Order 
Against Him as the Trustee Cannot Unilaterally Waive His Meritorious 
Defenses. 
The Lenders advance the Settlement as the basis for their requested duplicate 
judgment. While it is true that, in general, a bankruptcy trustee has authority to settle 
lawsuits implicating estate assets, that general rule does not apply in this case. Nor does 
the Trustee's power have any bearing on whether this Court should reverse and remand 
based on the Settlement. Here, Rindlesbach does not contest the Trustee's power to settle 
claims with the Lenders. Rindlesbach contests the Trustee's power to unilaterally waive 
Rindlesbach' s defenses in a case from which he was dismissed before filing for 
bankruptcy. 
The Hardy Lenders argue that the dismissal is appropriate simply because the 
Trustee has stipulated to it. A bankruptcy trustee may not waive a debtor's defenses in an 
action, and the debtor may assert them concurrently with the trustee. See In re Larkin, 
468 B.R. 431,436 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2012); see also In re Maier, 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 
6222, 2012 WL 9187579 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. Dec. 14, 2012); In re Nasr, 120 B.R. 855, 
858 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1990); 5 Collier on Bankruptcy 1558.01. ''[W]hile § 54l(a)(l) 
effectively transfers a debtor's causes of action into the bankruptcy estate, the debtor still 
has access to, and may assert, personal defenses." In re Beach, 447 B.R. 313, 323 
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(Bankr. D. Idaho 2011) (citing 5 Collier on Bankruptcy,~ 558.0l(l)(a) (Alan N. Resnick 
& Henry J. Sommer, 16th ed.). 
Other parties have argued, as the Hardy Lenders and the Trustee do now, that it is 
the bankruptcy estate that holds the debtor's defenses. Such an argument, however, has 
been expressly rejected by the bankruptcy courts. For example, in Larkin, a bankruptcy 
trustee sought approval from the bankruptcy court to settle a state court action with a 
debtor's creditor. See 468 B.R. at 433. By the terms of the stipulation and settlement, the 
creditor would pay the bankruptcy estate $10,000 in exchange for the complete waiver of 
debtor's defenses and counterclaim in the state court action. See id. at 433-34. The 
bankruptcy court declined to approve the stipulation, concluding that the waiver of the 
debtor's defenses was "beyond the Trustee's power." Id. at 437. The bankruptcy court 
held that, while the Bankruptcy Code allows a trustee to assert a defense concurrently 
with the debtor, "[a] trustee's waiver of the right to assert a defense of the debtor does not 
preclude the debtor from independently raising the same defense." Id. at 436. The 
bankruptcy court further concluded that "the Trustee may waive the Debtor's Defenses 
on behalf of the estate, but may not waive the Defenses in any manner that purports to 
limit the Debtor's right to use such Defenses." Id. 
The court of In re Maier, similarly rejected any settlement by a trustee that 
purported to take the defenses of a debtor. 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 6222 at *6-8. The court 
of In re Nasr also rejected a trustee's arguments that the debtor could not raise defenses 
owned by the bankruptcy estate, holding defenses "are not exclusive to the trustee and 
may be asserted by the debtor." 120 B.R. 855 at 858. Notably, neither the Trustee, nor 
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. the Hardy Lenders, have put forth any cases contradicting Larkin, Maier, Nasr, and 
Beach. 
Just like the parties in Larkin, Maier, and Nasr, the Hardy Lenders argue that 
Mark L. Rindlesbach lacks standing to challenge the reversal of the Summary Judgment 
because any defenses he raises are owned by the Trustee - who is stipulating to the 
Motion. The Trustee attempts to stipulate around Rindlesbach' s defense to individually 
liability in the proceedings below. In fact, the Trustee attempt to take his powers one step 
further than the trustee in Larkin. The Trustee seeks not only waiver of Rindlesbach's 
unadjudicated defenses. The Trustee seeks to reinstate Rindlesbach as a defendant and 
allow judgment to be entered against him, even though he was dismissed more than two 
years ago. This result appears an even greater abuse of the Trustee's proper role given 
that the Lenders have spent the last two years collecting against their judgment against 
the Plan-the very judgment they now seek against Rindlesbach. 
The only way that the Hardy Lenders can prevail in reversing the trial court, 
however, is if this Court rules that Mark L. Rindlesbach's defenses were waived by the 
Trustee, which, as demonstrated above, exceeds the lawful powers of a Chapter 7 trustee. 
Moreover, as discussed in greater detail below, this court would also violate the 
injunction imposed upon Mark L. Rindlesbach's discharge. Mark L. Rindlesbach is 
entitled to defend himself in an appeal attacking a judgment dismissing him from the 
case. In light of the case law, and with no case law supporting the Hardy Lenders 
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position, Mark L. Rindlesbach must be permitted to maintain his defenses and has 
standing to object to the entrance of any order reversing the Summary Judgment Ruling.37 
B. The Appeal Is Moot Because Reversal and Remand Would Lead to Entry of 
Judgment Against Rindlesbach Individually, Which Violates the Bankruptcy 
Injunction and Exceeds the Relief the Lenders Sought in the Proceeding 
Below. 
The Appellants' Brief completely overlooks the elephant in the room. The Court 
cannot reverse and remand for entry of judgment against Rindlesbach individually 
because it would exceed the scope of relief the Lenders pleaded in their Second Amended 
Complaint. It would also violate Rindlesbach's bankruptcy discharge. 
1. Judgment Against Rindlesbach Individually Exceeds the Relief the Lenders 
Sought in their Pleadings. 
"Under Utah law, '[i]fthe requested judicial relief cannot affect the rights of the 
litigants, the case is moot and a court will normally refrain from adjudicating it on the 
merits."' Murray City v. Maese, 2011 UT App 73, 12,251 P.3d 843 (alteration in 
original) (quoting Duran v. Morris, 635 P.2d 43, 45 (Utah 1981)). A party's ''requested 
judicial relief cannot affect the rights of the litigants" where the party appealing has 
already obtained everything it asked for in the proceeding below. See id. 
In this case, the Lenders' requested relief Uudgment against Rindlesbach) cannot 
affect the parties' rights because the Lenders have already obtained everything they asked 
for in the Second Amended Complaint. The Second Amended Complaint pleaded 
37 While the bankruptcy court approved the Settlement over Mark L. Rindlesbach' s 
objection, this approval was error. Mark L. Rindlesbach has raised this issue in a Notice 
of Appeal filed with the United States District Court, pending before Judge Clark 
Waddoups, Case No. 2:14-cv-00577. 
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damages against the Plan or against Rindlesbach, not damages against both. The 
Lenders, through the Judgment, obtained all the relief they sought in the proceeding 
below-a judgment against the Plan totaling over $6 million. 
The Lenders overlook this reality and ask the Court to simply tum a blind eye to it. 
The Lenders, at the end of the day, would like to have their $6 million judgment against 
the Plan and a $4 million dollar judgment against Rindlesbach individually. There are at 
least two major problems with this request. First, as discussed below, there is no basis in 
Utah law to hold Rindlesbach personally liable on a contract that he indisputably signed 
in his capacity as Plan trustee. But, even if Rindlesbach could be personally liable 
though he signed as trustee, there is no basis in law or equity to hold both the Plan and 
Rindlesbach liable. 
The Lenders, in essence, ask the Court to go back to the Guaranty and rewrite it 
and treat the Plan and Rindlesbach as though they had both signed it. If the Lenders 
wanted both the Plan and Rindlesbach on the hook, they could have required both to sign. 
The Court cannot now impose a de facto reformation and make a better contract for the 
Lenders than they secured for themselves. See UP. C., Inc. v. R. O.A. General, Inc., 1999 
UT App 303, ,I 41, 990 P.2d 945 ("'[A] court may not make a better contract for the 
parties than they have made for themselves; furthermore, a court may not enforce 
asserted rights not supported by the contract itself."'). Similarly, reversal and entry of 
judgment against Rindlesbach would amount to a de facto amendment of the Lenders' 
Second Amended Complaint and allow them, without a good faith legal basis, to assert 
claims against both the Plan and Rindles bach. It is axiomatic that courts will not award 
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relief that is not pleaded, tried, or proven. See Utah R. Civ. P. 8(a) ("An original claim .. 
. shall contain a short and plain ... statement of the claim showing that the party is 
entitled to relief .... "); Utah R. Civ. P. 54(c)(l) ("[E]xcept as provided in Rule 8(a), 
every final judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered 
is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in his pleadings." ( emphasis 
added)); Combe v. Warren's Family Drive-Inns, Inc., 680 P.2d 733, 735 (Utah 1984) 
("Although Rule 54( c )( 1) permits relief on grounds not pleaded, that rule does not go so 
far as to authorize the granting of relief on issues neither raised or tried."). 
2. Judgment Against Rindlesbach Individually Would Violate Rindlesbach's 
Bankruptcy Discharge. 
Section 524 of Title 11 of the Bankruptcy Code provides that a discharge 
;·operates as an injunction against the commencement or continuation of an action~ the 
employment of process, or an act, to collect, recover or offset any such debt, as a personal 
liability of the debtor .... " 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2). Accordingly, after a discharge there 
can be no "action," "process," or "act" against the debtor, Mark L. Rindlesbach - any 
third party is enjoined from pursing a discharged debtor. 
Despite the discharge and injunction the Trustee now moves this Court to reverse 
the trial court and remand for further proceedings against Mark L. Rindlesbach. 
Rindlesbach received a discharge from the bankruptcy court just days after the 
bankruptcy court entered an order approving the Settlement. See Notice of Discharge, 
attached to Addendum as Exhibit 4. Any action by this Court reversing the Summary 
Judgment Ruling against Rindlesbach would violate the discharge injunction. 
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The Bankruptcy Court was very clear at the hearing that the Settlement Agreement 
did not authorize the Lenders to pursue Rindlesbach post-discharge. The Bankruptcy 
Court stated that, upon the approval of the Settlement Agreement and Rindlesbach's 
subsequent discharge, neither the Hardy Parties, nor any other third-parties, could pursue 
Rindlesbach in his individual capacity. See Statements of Fact 33. 
The Trustee also stated what it intended with the discharge to be entered after the 
Settlement Agreement. See Statements of Fact 33. This Court too has previously 
recognized the limitations imposed upon it and the Hardy Lenders by the discharge. See 
August 21, 2014 Order. 
The Lenders argue that they are permitted to pursue fraudulent transfer actions 
against third-parties and that the injunction does not stop them from doing so. The 
Lenders are correct. However, the right to pursue fraudulent transfer actions does not 
give them the right to pursue claims against the discharged debtor. Because the relief the 
Lenders seek violates Rindlesbach's discharge, the relief is unavailable, and the Lenders' 
appeal is moot. 
C. Reversing Dismissal of Rindlesbach is Contrary to the Jury Verdict and 
Public Policy 
1. The Reversal and Entry of Judgment is Contrary to the Jury Verdict and 
Unnecessary. 
Here, The Lenders claim that reversal of summary judgment against Mark is 
needed in order to pursue fraudulent transfer actions against Rindlesbach's relatives. 
This argument is confusing. As discussed above, the Lenders' motivation for seeking the 
judgment has no bearing on whether it is properly taken under Utah law and given the 
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facts and pleadings in this case. Even more fundamentally, though, it is unclear what 
basis the Lenders would have to "claw-back," through fraudulent transfer actions, 
transfers that Rindlesbach made. If the Lenders are attempting to collect a judgment 
against the Plan, and the Plan is the only party indebted to the Lenders, Rindlesbach's 
transfers of personal funds are irrelevant. The Lenders cannot bring an action to recover 
them in the name of satisfying their judgment against the Plan. 
The Lenders point out that their claim is for "the reduced amount of $4 million,'' 
which obviated the need to adjudicate the proper amount of the Lenders' claim against 
Rindlesbach's bankruptcy estate.38 The Lenders miss the point. The $4 million figure 
clearly demonstrates that the relief they seek has no basis in fact or evidence in this case 
where a jury has already found damages against the Plan in excess of $6 million. And, 
calling the $4 million a "reduced amount" ironically ignores the fact that they seek to add 
$ 4 million dollars on top of the $6 million judgment upon which the Lenders have been 
collecting (with no apparent plans to alter course) for over two years. 
The Lenders also claim that "[t]he Bankruptcy Court granted" the Trustee 
authority to enter into the Settlement and stipulate to reversal in this case. 39 While it is 
true that the Bankruptcy Court approved the Settlement, that in no way compels the result 
the Lenders seek. The Bankruptcy Court made very clear that it thought the Settlement 
unusual on this point and made equally clear that the Bankruptcy Court would not purport 
to order the Court to reverse and remand. The Bankruptcy Court's approval signals only 
38 Appellants' Br. 9. 
39 Appellants' Br. 10. 
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what the Trustee could do. The Lenders seek to bootstrap that into what this Court 
should do. But the Settlement is irrelevant and is not probative of whether reversal is 
warranted in this appeal. Tellingly, the Lenders cite no case wherein a bankruptcy trustee 
stipulates with a principal creditor to reverse a prior judgment in the debtors favor to 
allow the creditor to pursue judgment against the debtor post-discharge. Research reveals 
no such case. 
2. Reversal is a Waste of Judicial Resources and Contrary to Public Policy 
i. Reversal is a Waste of Judicial Resources and Will Create a Legal 
Quagmire. 
The Lenders invoke public policy to argue that the Court should favor settlement 
of the Lenders' claims to foster private resolution of the Trustee's and the Lenders' 
claims and conserve judicial and estate resources. Public policy, however, cuts directly 
against the Settlement and entry of a second judgment in favor of the Lenders. 
The relief requested does not serve the interests of judicial economy and finality 
but merely spawns continued litigation on an issue outside the proceeding below and not 
part of the record on this appeal. See Utah Dep 't of Adm in. Servs. v. Public Serv. 
Comm 'n, 65 8 P .2d 601, 613 (Utah 1983) ("One reason public policy favors the settlement 
of disputes by compromise is that this avoids the delay and the public and private 
expense of litigation."). Cf MacKayv. Hardy, 973 P.2d 941,947 (Utah 1998) ("Judicial 
economy and the parties' interests in finality of judgment are in no way furthered if 
parties are allowed to engage in piecemeal appeals"). It creates a tangle of unresolved 
issues and casts doubt on the finality of the judgment against the Plan. 
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Even if judgment could be properly taken against Rindlesbach after the proceeding 
in the trial court, the amount of the judgment is by no means certain. The Lenders 
offered, and the jury heard, no evidence on damages Rindlesbach owed in his individual 
capacity. There are no findings of fact that the Court could use to render a judgment 
against Rindles bach. As such, this Court would not be prepared to order entry of 
judgment against Rindlesbach for $4 million - nor could it without a jury. At most it 
could reverse for further proceedings by the trial court and a jury trial ( which as 
discussed below expressly violates the injunction prohibiting actions against Rindlesbach, 
a discharged bankruptcy debtor). See State v. Mirquet, 914 P.2d 1144 (Utah 1996) 
(stating that the appellate court can only dispose of a matter where there is no issue in the 
underlying facts and no additional evidence relevant to dispositive issues); Alder v. Bayer 
Corp. 2002 UT 115, 61 P.3d 1068 (court must remand to the trial court for factual 
determinations). 
Accordingly, reversal and remand based on the Settlement, not on the legal merits 
of the appeal, raises an entirely separate, appealable issue. 
11. Public Policy Does Not Encourage Reversal 
Public policy favors settlement only where the settlement is consistent with the 
rights of all concerned parties. See, e.g., Ziarko v. Sao Line R. Co., 641 N .E.2d 402, 410 
(Ill. 1994); Triad Energy Corp. of West Virginia, Inc. v. Renner, 600 S.E.2d 285, 288 (W. 
Va. 2004). 
The Lenders' reliance on Neary v. Regents of the Univ. of California, 834 P.2d 
119, 125 (Cal. 1992) to support its public policy argument is misplaced. Neary is 
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inapposite because it is distinguishable from the facts of this case and does not provide 
the rule governing reversal in this context. With respect to the facts, in Neary, unlike in 
this case, all concerned parties agreed to the stipulated reversal. See 834 P .2d at 120. 
There was no interested party like Rindlesbach opposing the reversal. See id. As such, 
the court of appeal's decision to deny the stipulated reversal and dismissal essentially 
required parties to continue fighting after an agreement had been reached. 
In addition, Neary is not like this case because, in Neary, the settlement, reversal, 
and dismissal of the case would actually quell an ongoing dispute. By contrast, here, as 
discussed above, the Lenders are actually the ones that seek to multiply litigation by 
reinstating dismissed claims and calling into question the validity of the judgment against 
the Plan. In fact, this case, unlike Neary does not even save the parties from the cost and 
expense of the appeal and the associated briefing. In Neary, had the court of appeal 
followed the stipulation and reversed the case, it would have saved the parties' the cost of 
the appeal. Judicial economy is not served where the parties must incur the expense of 
the appeal (much less additional litigation) notwithstanding the stipulation. See Lucich v. 
City of Oakland, 19 Cal. App. 4th 494, 501-502, 23 Cal. Rptr 2d. 450 (1993) 
(distinguishing and declining to follow Neary where the parties entered into the 
settlement after the briefing, oral argument, and submission of the appeal because no 
"interests of judicial or private economy would be served"). 
In addition to being distinguishable on its facts, Neary is at odds with other cases 
addressing reversal of trial court rulings. For example, the Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals has held: 
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"[P]arties cannot compel [the court] to reverse ( or modify) a 
district court's determination by stipulation. Reversal of a 
district court's order requires [the court's] examination of the 
merits of the case, thereby invoking our judicial function. 
Parties may not, by stipulation or other means, usurp [the 
court's] Article III powers. Parties may, of course, either (1) 
move to dismiss an appeal voluntarily, or (2) moot an appeal 
by acting in a manner tha~ obviates resolution of the pending 
controversy, but in such cases this court can do no more than 
dismiss the appeal and, where appropriate, direct that the 
judgment appealed be vacated. Even joint action of the parties 
to an appeal may not effect or compel a substantive alteration 
of the judicial disposition under review." 
Bolin v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 32 F.3d 449,450 (10th Cir. 1994); see also 
United States v. Furman,} 12 F.3d 435,438 (10th Cir. 1997). Though Utah case law 
lacks such a clear pronouncement, the Utah Supreme Court has noted that it is "not 
permitted to reverse a trial court unless it has committed reversible error during some of 
the proceedings in this case." State v. Hansen, 540 P.2d 935, 936 (Utah 1975); see also 
Great Salt Lake Minerals & Chemical Corp. v Arthur G. McKee & Co., 539 P.2d 371 
(Utah 1975) (holding that the Supreme Court could not overturn the trial court unless the 
evidence would sway all reasonable minds against the trial court's findings). 
In sum, the Lenders cannot support their quest for reversal and judgment against 
Rindlesbach with the Settlement. The Settlement has no bearing on this case, and the 
Court must consider the merits of the Lenders' claim against Rindlesbach individually. 
This includes consideration of Rindlesbach's defenses separately from the Trustee's 
stipulation. 
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D. The Trial Court Correctly Held That Rindlesbach Is Not Personally Liable 
Under The Guaranty. 
There may have been a time when, under common law, a trustee would be 
personally liable for contracts entered into on behalf of a trust. See Galdjie v. Darwish, 
113 Cal. App. 4th 1331, 1343-49, 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d 178 (reciting "a brief review of 
common law as it relates to suits involving trusts and trustees"); Bogert's Trust and 
Trustees§ 712 (same). This now antiquated view stems from the fact that a trust is not a <; 
legal entity. See Galdjie, 113 Cal. App. 4th at 1343 (''Unlike a corporation, a trust is not 
a legal entity."). Many early cases held that a trust could neither sue nor be sued and, 
indeed, a trustee could not bind trust assets to contracts made with third parties. See, e.g., 
Societe Generate v. US. Bank Nat 'l Ass 'n, 325 F. Supp. 2d 435,437 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) 
('~[A] trustee cannot, through contract, directly bind the trust estate or its beneficiary." 
(quoting Taylor v. Mayo, 110 U.S. 330,335 (1884)); Galdjie, 113 Cal. App. 4th at 1344; 
Bogert's Trust and Trustees § 712. However, even this historic general rule was not 
uniform across the United States and many cases allowed a third party to proceed directly 
against the trust assets. See Bogert's Trust and Trustees§ 712 (collecting cases). 
Trust law has since moved away from the general rule set forth above. "Today, 
either by statute or by judicial decision, the majority of United States jurisdictions 
provide for suits against trustees in their representative, rather than their personal 
capacities, provided the representative capacity was disclosed." See id. The Restatement 
(Third) of Trusts states that a trustee is personally liable "on a contract entered into in the 
course of trust administration only if': 
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(a) in so doing, the trustee committed a breach of 
trust; or 
(b) the trustee's representative capacity was 
undisclosed and unknown to the third party; or 
( c) the contract so provides. 
Restatement (Third) of Trusts§ 106(1). The Restatement (Third) of Trusts 
recognizes that it departs from the rule on personal trustee liability set forth in the 
Restatement (Second) of Trusts. See id. Reporter's Notes on§ 106. This change is "to 
reflect the now-prevalent doctrine authorizing third parties to proceed against a trust, i.e., 
against a trustee in the trustee's representative capacity ... with the trustee protected 
from personal liability to the extent the trustee acted properly.'' Id. Indeed, the current 
view is that a trustee of a business trust is not individually liable for contracts that it 
enters into on behalf of the trust and where the trustee signs the contract in his 
representative capacity. One leading treatise, which the Lenders cite, notes: 
The mere signing of an obligation by trustees in their 
individual names with the descriptive words 4trustees' or the 
like added to their signature does not alone except them from 
personal liability, but the rule is usually otherwise where they 
sign in the trust name or in such a manner as clearly to 
specify that they are signing on behalf of the trust alone and 
not as individuals. 
16A Fletcher Cyc. Corp.§ 8254; see also Adams v. Swig, 125 N.E. 857, 861-62 (Mass. 
1920). 
In this case, the Lenders attempt to sidestep this shift in the law by distinguishing 
between trusts subject to the Uniform Probate Code and/or Uniform Trust Code and those 
subject to background common law principles. As an initial matter, Rindlesbach 
concedes that the Utah Uniform Trust Code, Utah Code Ann.§ 75-7-1010 does not apply 
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in this case. Rindlesbach argued as much before the trial court and, ironically, it was the 
Lenders thought sought to apply Section 75-7-1010. However, as the district court noted 
below, while the Utah Probate and Trust Codes do not control this case, they are 
indicative of the shift in the law of trusts that has taken place over the last hundred years. 
At least in Utah, these statutes have occupied the field of trustee liability for decades and 
research reveals no "business trust" case decided under common law. This is not a case 
where the Court can simply peel back the statute and apply the prior law as the Lenders 
urge. The statutes reflect a fundamental difference in who a third party dealing with a 
trust can sue and from where damages may be collected. The statutes do nothing more 
than reflect the prevalent view that a third party dealing with a trust should be able to 
seek recovery from trust assets and that the trustee is not generally personally liable. 
Even without the statute, this is the better-reasoned view and, therefore, the likely result 
under the common law of trusts. The Lenders ask the Court to rewind a hundred years of 
legal development and impose a regime that does not reflect modern views of entity and 
fiduciary liability. 
The Lenders, however, ask the Court to adopt only a portion of the ancient 
common law rule. The Lenders want personal liability for Rindlesbach but they overlook 
the second part of the former rule-that a trustee of a trust cannot bind the trust to 
contracts with third parties implicating trust assets. Of course, the Lenders stop far short 
of suggesting that only Rindlesbach is liable, and Rindlesbach lacked power to bind the 
Plan. Indeed, the Lenders could not make such an argument because they have spent the 
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last few years collecting on their judgment against the Plan. The Lenders cannot have 
their cake and eat it too. 
The Lenders cite Andrus v. Blazzard, 63 P. 888 (Utah 190 I) as support for their 
claim that Rindlesbach is personally liable. As the trial court pointed out, Andrus does 
not control in this case for at least two main reasons. First, Andrus dealt with a 
fiduciary's liability in the probate context (whether a guardian would be personally liable 
for debts incurred on behalf of the ward). See 63 P. 889-90. A guardian's liability for 
such debt, like a trustee's personal liability, is now governed by statute. See Utah Code 
Ann.§ 75-5-429. Andrus has no bearing on how a similar case would come out today 
under Utah's current. Second, Andrus was decided long before the modem view of 
trustee and entity liability became prevalent. Even if the modern statutes governing 
guardian and trustee liability do not apply, the better-reasoned common law result would 
be informed by the statutes and recognize the shift in the law's view toward 
fiduciary/principal liability. There is no reason that the modem, common law view 
should be any different than the controlling statutes. Accordingly, the result in this case 
should differ from Andrus, even in the absence of a controlling modem statute. 
The other cases and authorities that the Lenders cite are distinguishable for similar 
reasons. The Lenders reliance on Gibbons v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 262 F.2d 852 
(1958) is misplaced. That case imposes individual liability on a trustee. But the only 
support cited is the Bogert treatise, cited above, which now makes clear that the law has 
shifted away from individual liability, and the first Restatement of Trusts, which also lays 
down the former rule. The courts applied the same outdated rule in Taylor v. Mayo, 110 
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U.S. 330 (1884); Societe Generate v. US. Bank Nat'! Ass 'n, 325 F. Supp. 2d 435 
(S.D.N.Y. 2004); Colorado Springs Cablevision, Inc. v. Lively, 579 F. Supp 252 (D. 
Colo. 1984); Taylor v. Richomd's New Approach Ass 'n, Inc., 351 So. 2d 1094 (Fla. Ct. 
App. 1977); Maine Shipyard & Marine Ry. V. Lilley, 7 43 A.2d 1264 (Maine 2000); and 
Frist Eastern Bank, N.A. v. Jones, 602 N.E.2d 211,215 (Mass. Jud. Ct. 1992). In those 
jurisdictions, as in Utah, legislatures have since passed statutes that reflect the modern 
thinking concerning trust liability. 4° Further, in at least some of those cases, the 
outcome-personal liability for the trustee-was expressly based on the equally outdate 
premise that "a trustee cannot through contract, directly bind the trust estate or its 
beneficiary." Societe Generale, 325 F. Supp. 2d at 437; see also Taylor, 110 U.S. at 
335-36. As noted above, the Lenders make no argument (nor could they) that 
Rindlesbach's liability should be premised on his inability to bind the Plan. The Lenders 
cannot claim that Andrus and the other cases they cite "applied precisely the same 
common law rule as advocated by the [Lenders]."41 Again, they seek to apply only 
"half' of the ancient common law rule. 
The bottom line is that the Lenders do not, and cannot, cite a single case wherein a 
third party proceeded against both a trustee and a trust on a contract signed only once by 
the trustee in his or her fiduciary capacity. Formerly, the law favored action against the 
40 The Lenders also cite Just Pants v. Bank of Ravenswood, 438 N.E.2d 331 (Ill. 1985). 
Illinois apparently still inheres more or less to the ancient common law rule, and its 
current statutes provide for only partial limited liability for a trustee. See Bogert § 712 
n.31. In this respect, Illinois appears to be an outlier and does not reflect the prevailing 
view. 
41 Appellant's Br. 18. 
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fiduciary individually. Now the law favors proceeding directly against the trust. But 
neither regime ever prescribed the relief the Lenders' seek-two signatures for the price 
of one. The Lenders' requested relief overreaches regardless of whether the Court 
decides to apply the ancient or modern rule. Even if Rindlesbach could be liable under 
modern trust law, personal liability is inappropriate here where the Lenders have spent 
the last two years directly pursuing trust assets. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should deny the appeal and affirm the trial 
court's summary judgment ruling and subsequent dismissal ofRindlesbach individually. 
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using Microsoft Word's word count feature. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 6th day of April, 2015. 
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EXHIBIT 1 
Memorandum Decision (R.4269-76) 
FU.ED lHS1flfUC1f COURT 
Third Judicial District 
FEB O 6 2012 
In the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County,4tate offi~uuu.-.,· 
RUTH B. HARDY REVOCABLE TRUST, 
et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
ROBERT A. JONES, et al., 
Defendants. 
INTRODUCTION 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No. 080913314 
Hon. Deno G. Himonas 
There are currently five motions that remain pending I in this matter: (1) Defendant Mark 
L. Rindlesbach's motion for summary judgment in his favor on Plaintiffs' claims, (2) Plaintiffs' 
motion for summary judgment in their favor against Defendant Rindlesbach Construction Inc. 
Profit Plan (the Plan), (3) Rindlesbach's motion to amend his answer to assert a defense that 
federal law preempts Plaintiffs' claims, (4) Plaintiffs' motion to strike Rindlesbach's federal 
preemption defense, and (5) Plaintiffs' evidentiary objections to declarations that Rindlesbach 
submitted. For the reasons discussed below, I GRANT Rindlesbach's motion for summary 
judgment, GRANT, in part, and DENY, in part, Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, and 
DISMISS the motion to amend, motion to strike, and evidentiary objections as moot. 
BACKGROUND 
Plaintiffs' claims against Rindlesbach and the Plan relate to a loan agreement (the 
Agreement) and a Guaranty (the Guaranty) that were entered into in May 2007. Plaintiffs had a 
third party, Sutherland Title Company (STC), draft the documents. The Agreement states that 
Plaintiffs would provide a 3.3 million dollar loan to Eagle Mountain Lots, LLC (EML).2 
According to Plaintiffs, they insisted on having several guarantors guarantee repayment as a 
condition before Plaintiffs would provide the requested financing. In connection with that 
requirement, Plaintiffs had STC prepare the Guaranty for the signatures of several guarantors, 
including one signature block bearing Rindlesbach' s name. 
On May 25, 2007, Rindlesbach went to the STC offices, where he was presented with a 
copy of the Guaranty for his signature. However, rather than signing the signature block above 
his name, Rindlesbach crossed off his name, handwrote a new signature block indicating that he 
was acting as the Plan's Trustee, and executed the Guaranty below the handwritten signature 
1 The Court has granted or denied (with or without prejudice), either in whole or in part, all other pending matters. 
2 The Agreement initially listed another borrower, Land Design Group, LLC (LOG), but LOG was deleted as a 
borrower before the final version of the Agreement was executed. Nevertheless, LDG is listed as a borrower in the 
Guaranty, which Plaintiffs claim was due to a scrivener's error. 
I 
, . - ... ~ 
block.3 The Plan disputes that Rindlesbach's signature, by itself, was sufficient to bind the Plan 
because the Plan's governing documents had allegedly been amended to require the signature of 
Rindlesbach' s co-trustee. 
Either shortly before or after Rindlesbach executed the Guaranty, Plaintiffs began the 
process of transferring the loan funds to EML. Ultimately, EML defaulted on the loan and 
Plaintiffs brought this action to seek recovery from the Plan, Rindlesbach, and others.4 
ANALYSIS 
Rindlesbach now seeks summary judgment in his favor on Plaintiffs' claims against him 
personally. In their motion, Plaintiffs seek summary judgment in their favor on their claims 
against the Plan. "Summary judgment is appropriate 'if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law."' Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, , 13, 177 P .3d 600 ( quoting Utah R Civ. P. 
56(c)). Therefore, beginning with Rindlescbach's motion for summary judgment, I analyze each 
party's motion to determine whether they are entitled to summary judgment. In doing so, I 
"view[]the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party." Id, 6 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
I. Rindlesbacl, 's Motion for Summary Judgment 
Turning first to Rindlesbach's motion for summary judgment, Rindlesbach argues that he 
signed the Guaranty in his capacity as trustee or co-trustee of the Plan, and therefore, is not 
personally liable under Utah law.5 In response, Plaintiffs assert that Utah law imposes personal 
liability on a trustee who signs a contract. In support of that assertion, Plaintiffs cite several 
cases for the proposition that, "At common law, a trustee is personally liable for every obligation 
he incurs in his capacity as trustee unless he expressly stipulates that he is not to be personally 
responsible." (Mem. Opp. 6.) I disagree with Plaintiffs and, based on the great weight of the 
common law, I conclude that a trustee is not liable under a contract where it is clear that the 
trustee signed the contract in that capacity on behalf of the trust. 
First, the cases cited by Plaintiffs do not control because they are factually 
distinguishable, are not binding on this Court, or have been overruled, either in whole or in part, 
by statute. Plaintiffs cite only one Utah case, Andrus v. Blazzard, 23 Utah 233, 63 P. 888 (1901), 
to support their claim that a trustee is personally liable on a contract. However, Andrus is clearly 
distinguishable. In that case, our supreme court dealt with the liability of a guardian in a 
3 Including Rindlesbach's signature, the full text of the handwritten signature block states as follows: "Rindlesbach 
Const., Inc. Profit Sharing Plan by Mark L. Rindlesbach, Trustee." 
4 Plaintiffs' complaint lists causes of action against several other defendants but the issues and claims raised in the 
parties' motions do not relate to the claims against the other defendants. Consequently, this Memorandum Decision 
only addresses Plaintiffs' claims against Rindlesbach and the Plan. 
5 Rindlesbach also argues that he is not personally liable under the Employee Retirement and Income Security Act 
(ERISA), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1001, et seq (201 I). However, it is uMecessary for the Court to reach that argument in 
order to resolve the motion for summary judgment, and the Court declines to do so. 
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guardian-ward context, which the court likened to a conservatorship relationship. 6 See id at 
890-91. Moreover, the supreme court's holding that the guardian was personally liable, see id, 
has since been superseded, either in whole or in part, by statute, see Utah Code Ann. § 75-5-
429(1) (2011). Therefore, Andrus has only limited, if any, applicability to the case at bar. 
Plaintiffs next cite the decisions of several federal courts that have held a trustee is 
personally liable under the contract when they sign in their capacity as trustee. See Taylor v. 
Mayo, 110 U.S. 330, 335-36 (1884); Gibbons v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 262 F.2d 852, 855-56 
(10th Cir. 1958); Pan Am. Petroleum Corp v. Gibbons, 168 F.Supp. 867,876 (D. Utah 1958). 
However, it is well-settled that federal court decisions on matters of state law are not binding on 
state courts. See Woodv. Univ. of Utah Med. Ctr., 2002 UT 134, ,r 33; 67 P.3d 436; Cottonwood 
Mall Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 558 P.2d 1331, 1331 (Utah 1977); Robertson v. 
Gem Ins. Co., 828 P .2d 496, 502 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). Furthermore, the current legal landscape 
is vastly different from that which was in effect at the time the federal courts rendered their 
decisions, see generally Galdijie v. Darwish, 113 Cal. App. 4th 1331, 1344-48 (2003) 
(discussing the evolution of the law regarding a trustee's personal liability under a contract), 
which further diminishes any value the federal decisions might have in resolving this issue. 7 
Indeed, the most recent versions of the Uniform Trust Code and the Restatement adopt 
the modern view that a trustee is not personally liable under a contract where the trustee properly 
enters into the contract and the contract indicates that the trustee is signing in his or her capacity 
as trustee. 8 See Uniform Trust Code § 1010 (2000); Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 106 
(Tentative Draft No. 6, 2011). Likewise, the persuasive authority-including the current version 
of the treatise cited in two of the cases relied on by Plaintiffs-indicates that most states apply 
the modern rule that a trustee is not liable where the trustee signs in their capacity as trustee. See 
George G. Bogert, Amy M. Hess, Trusts & Trustees§ 712 (3d ed. 2009); 16A Fletcher 
Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations§ 8254 (rev. ed. 2003); 76 Am. Jur. 2d Trusts§ 
414 (2011); 90A C.J.S. Trusts§ 387 (2011). But see 63 Am. Jur. 2d Business Trusts§ 63 
(2011); 76 Am. Jur. 2d Trusts§ 410 (2011). Moreover, the federal cases cited by Plaintiffs have 
been expressly superseded in Utah because the legislature adopted the portion of the Uniform 
6 It is true that in dicta, the supreme court noted that other states applied the common law principle that a trustee who 
"undertakes to bind the [trust] estate, and fails to do so for want of authority, ... binds himself personally, and may 
be sued upon his contract individually. And in such cases it avails him nothing that he intended only to bind himself 
in his representative capacity." Andrus v. Blazzard, 23 Utah 233, 63 P. 888,894 (1901) (citation omitted). However, 
as explained below, that statement does not accurately reflect the current state of the law regarding trustees' liability. 
7 The same also holds true with respect to the changed legal landscape in Utah since the time Andrus was decided. 
8 The term "properly entered into," which is used in both the Uniform Trust Code and the Utah statutes based on the 
Uniform Trust Code, "mean[s] that the trustee is exercising an available power and is not violating a duty" to the 
beneficiaries of the trust. Unifonn Trust Code § IO IO cmt. (2000). The comment to the Restatement similarly states 
that a trustee improperly enters a contract where the trustee either exceeds their authority or violates their fiduciary 
duty to the beneficiaries of the trust. See Restatement (Third) of Trusts§ 106 cmt. (b)(l) (Tentative Draft No. 6, 
2011 ). Otherwise, a trustee is only personally liable on a contract "if: the terms of the contract so provide; or the 
trustee's representative capacity was not disclosed or known to the third party." Id Those exceptions clearly do not 
apply in this case. In addition, the provision that a trustee may be personally liable for his or her own torts, see 
Uniform Trust Code § 10 I O(b) & cmt.; Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 106(2) & cmt. (b )(2), also does not apply 
because, as the parties have acknowledged, Plaintiffs have not asserted any fraud, misrepresentation, or other tort 
claim against Rindlesbach. 
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Trust Code that eliminates a trustee's personal liability on a contract where the trustee properly 
enters into a contract and indicates that he or she is signing on behalf of the trust.9 See Utah 
Code Ann.§ 75-7-1010(1) (2011). Thus, like Andrus, the federal cases cited by Plaintiffs also 
do not resolve the issue before the Court. . 
In the absence of any controlling statutory or case law, the Court is left with the 
persuasive authority, which, as stated above, generally adopts the modem rule that a trustee is 
exempted from personal liability on a contract where the trustee "sign[ s] in the trust name or in 
such a manner as clearly to specify that they are signing on behalf of the trust alone and not as 
individuals." Fletcher Cyclopedia,§ 8254; accordUnifonn Trust Code§ 1010; Restatement 
(Third) of Trusts §106; 76 Am. Jur. 2d Trusts§ 414; 90A C.J.S. Trusts§ 387. Furthermore, in 
the only relevant statutes that have been brought to the Court's attention, the Utah Legislature 
has repeatedly expressed a preference that trustees and other fiduciaries should not be personally 
liable on contracts they properly entered into and executed in those capacities.10 See, e.g., Utah 
Code Ann. § 75-5-429(1); id § 75-7-1010(1). Based on that statutorily indicated preference and 
the great weight of persuasive authority, I conclude that a trustee is not personally liable on a 
contract where the trustee has authority to execute the contract and clearly indicates that they are 
on behalf of the trust in their capacity as trustee. 
There is no genuine issue of fact regarding whether the Plan had authorized Rindlesbach 
to sign the Guaranty and other similar documents on behalf of the Trust. 11 There is also no 
question that the handwritten signature block indicated that Rindlesbach was signing the 
Guaranty on behalf of the Plan, in his capacity as trustee. Therefore, as a matter of law, 
Rindlesbach is not personally liable on the Guaranty and is entitled to summary judgment. 
Accordingly, I GRANT Rindlesbach's motion for summary judgment. 
Moreover, that ruling makes it unnecessary to address Rindlesbach's motion to amend 
and Plaintiffs' motion to strike. Both the motion to amend and the motion to strike pertain to the 
federal preemption defense that Rindlesbach sought to raise, but because the claim against 
Rindlesbach has now been dismissed, any decision on the affirmative defense would not affect 
the outcome of the case and, therefore, would be merely advisory. See generally Summit Water 
Distrib. Co. v. Summit Cnty., 2005 UT 73,150, 123 P.3d 437 ("Our settled policy is to avoid 
giving advisory opinions in regard to issues unnecessary to the resolution of the claims before 
us."). Consequently, I DISMISS both the motion to amend and the motion to strike without 
addressing the merits of the motions. 
9 As Rindlesbach points out, Utah's Uniform Trust Code may not control this action because the Code does not 
apply to trusts like the Plan that are created "for the primary purpose of paying debts, dividends, interest, salaries, 
wages, profits, pensions, or employee benefits of any kind." Utah Code AM.§ 75-1-201(55) (2011). 
10 If7S-7-1010 were to apply, the outcome would be the same because it is undisputed that Rindlesbach was 
authorized to execute the Guaranty and that he clearly indicated that he was signing on behalf of the Plan rather than 
in his individual capacity. See generally Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-1010(1) ("[A] trustee is not personally liable on a 
contract properly entered into in the trustee's fiduciary capacity in the course of administering the trust if the trustee 
in the contract disclosed the fiduciary capacity."). 
11 There is, of course, a disputed issue of fact regarding whether his signature was sufficient to bind the Plan. 
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IL Plaintiffs' Motion/or Summary Judgment Against the Plan 
Next, Plaintiffs assert that they are entitled to summary judgment on their claims against 
the Plan. Before addressing that assertion, however, it is first necessary to address a preliminary 
issue. In their motion for summary judgment, Plaintiffs also seek the Court's reconsideration of 
Judge Lindberg's January 12, 2010 ruling in this case. However, such a request is improper in 
the context of a motion for summary judgment. Therefore, the Court DENIES the request to 
reconsider without prejudice to Plaintiffs' ability to raise those issues in a separate motion to 
reconsider. 
Turning to Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, Plaintiffs argue that they are 
entitled to summary judgment because they have established that: (1) The Guaranty should be 
refonned to remove LOG as a borrower, (2) the Guaranty is supported by adequate 
consideration, and (3) the two-signature amendment to the Plan's governing documents was a 
nullity and, consequently, Rindlesbach's signature was binding on the Plan. Although I agree 
that Plaintiffs have established that the Guaranty should be reformed, there are disputed issues of 
fact with respect to Plaintiffs' other claims. 
a. Plaintiffs are Entitled to Reformation of the Guaranty. 
Plaintiffs assert that the Guaranty should be reformed to remove LOG as a borrower 
because the inclusion of LDG in the Guaranty was due to an error on the part of the scrivener 
who drafted the loan documents. As Plaintiffs correctly state, the Guaranty and Agreement must 
be read together. "[U]nder established Utah law, when two agreements are 'executed 
substantially contemporaneously and are clearly interrelated, they must be construed as a whole 
and harmonized if possible.'" Shields v. Harris, 934 P .2d 653, 657 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) 
(quoting Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 109 (Utah 1991)) (additional quotation marks 
omitted). Here, it is undisputed that the Agreement and the Guaranty were executed as part of 
the same transaction over a relatively short time period, and therefore, the two documents must 
be read together. 
When the Guaranty and the Agreement are read together, it is apparent that there is a 
conflicting term that creates a facial ambiguity because the Guaranty includes LOG as a 
borrower while the Agreement omits any mention of LOG. See Cafe Rio, Inc. v. Larkin-Gifford-
Overton, LLC, 2009 UT 27,125,207 P.3d 1235 ("We have explained that ambiguity exists in a 
contract term or provision if it is capable of more than one reasonable interpretation because of 
uncertain meanings of terms, missing terms, or other facial deficiencies." (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). Plaintiffs have introduced uncontroverted evidence12 that the scrivener 
understood that LDG was supposed to be removed as a borrower but that the scrivener failed to 
12 The Plan argues that parol evidence is inadmissible to vary the terms of the Guaranty under Tangren Family Trust 
v. Tangren, 2008 UT 20, 182 P.3d 326, where the Utah Supreme Court held that parol evidence is not admissible 
where a contract is integrated and unambiguous, see id. 'ilf 16-17. I do not read Tangren so broadly. First, the 
question of whether parol evidence is admissible in a reformation claim was not before the court in Tangren. 
Moreover, to read Tangren as broadly as the Plan suggests would effectively overturn a century's worth of supreme 
court decisions to the contrary and make the doctrine of reformation inapplicable to a written contract. See Jensen 
v. Manila Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 565 P.2d 63, 64 (Utah 1977) ("Appellant is in 
error in her contention that testimony concerning the mistake was inadmissible because it varied the terms of a 
written contract. If such a contention could be sustained then the equitable theory of reformation of contracts would 
not apply to written instruments."). 
s 
do so. Indeed, other than citing to the language of the Guaranty itself, the Plan makes no attempt 
to show that the parties intended that LOG be listed as a borrower. Thus, it is undisputed that the 
parties did not intend for LOG to be listed as a borrower on the Guaranty. Consequently, it is 
appropriate for the Court to reform the Guaranty to remove LOG as a borrower, which also 
makes it possible to harmonize the provisions of the two documents. See Haslem v. Ottosen, 689 
P.2d 27, 30-31 (Utah 1984). Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs' motion for summary 
judgment with respect to their claim that the Guaranty should be reformed. 13 
b. Disputed Issues of Fact Exist With Respect to Plaintiffs' Other Claims. 
Turning to Plaintiffs' other arguments, it is evident that there are disputed issues of fact 
that would preclude the entry of summary judgment. First, in denying the Plan's motion for 
summary judgment on Plaintiffs' claims, the Court determined that there are disputed issues of 
fact regarding the validity of the two-signature amendment. Those same factual disputes are also 
present here, which makes summary judgment on that issue inappropriate. Second, there is also 
a factual dispute with respect to the adequacy of consideration and Plaintiffs' allegation that they 
were relying on the Plan's guarantee of repayment. Drawing all inferences in favor of the Plan, 
as I must, the following facts, among others, show that Plaintiffs may have been relying on 
Rindlesbach' s personal guarantee, rather than the Plan's guarantee ofrepayment: (I) The 
Guaranty was drafted for Rindlesbach's personal signature, and (2) one of the lenders, Don 
Parker, gave sworn testimony that he did not know whether Rindlesbach would sign personally 
or on behalf of the Plan. 14 Those disputed issues of fact preclude the entry of summary judgment 
in Plaintiffs' favor on their claims against the Plan. Therefore, I DENY the remainder of 
Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. 
Having determined that Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment should be denied, that 
also makes it unnecessary to reach Plaintiffs' evidentiary objections, much of which relate to 
Rindlesbach' s calculations regarding the amount owing on the loan. I do not believe I have not 
relied on any of the allegedly objectionable statements in reaching these decisions. Therefore, I 
DISMISS the evidentiary objections without prejudice. 
CONCLUSION 
As stated above, under Utah law, a trustee is not liable on a contract where he or she 
properly enters into the contract on behalf of the trust in their official capacity. It is undisputed 
that Rindlesbach did so here, and therefore, I GRANT Rindlesbach's motion for summary 
judgment. Because that makes it unnecessary to address the federal preemption defense, I 
DISMISS the motion to amend and the motion to strike without prejudice. 
The undisputed evidence shows that the parties did not intend to include LOG as a 
borrower in the Guaranty. Therefore, I GRANT Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, 
insofar as it seeks reformation of the Guaranty to remove LOG as a borrower. However, there 
13 I recognize that a party must establish their entitlement to reformation by clear and convincing evidence, see 
Has/em v. Ottosen, 689 P .2d 27, 30 (Utah 1984); Wolf Mountain Resorts, LC v. ASC Utah, Inc., 2011 UT App 425, 
'iI 10,697 Utah Adv. Rep. 27, and I have taken that into consideration in evaluating Plaintiffs' claim. 
14 The Court believes that due to these issues of fact, the additional arguments made by Plaintiffs, i.e., invalid 
ratification, equitable estoppel, etc., are rendered moot. 
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are disputed issues of fact regarding whether Rindlesbach' s signature was sufficient to bind the 
Plan and whether Plaintiffs did, in fact, rely on the Plan's guarantee of repayment. Accordingly, 
I DENY the remainder of Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment against the Plan. Because I 
did not rely on any of the allegedly objectionable statements in Rindlesbach's declaration, I also 
DISMISS Plaintiffs' evidentiary objections without prejudice. Finally, it was improper for 
Plaintiffs to bring their request to reconsider in the context of the summary judgment, and 
therefore, I DENY the request without prejudice to the filing of a proper motion to reconsider. 
DATED this V-" day of February, 2012 
7 
Deno G. Himonas 
District Court Judge 
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Settlement Agreement 
G~.~-~ l~.-.3.0.5.S2 O.oc.35.8. Filed 0.7./21/14. Entered.07/21/14.16:14:29 Desc P.ending 
Order Granting Trustees Motions for Order Approving: (1) Settlemen Page 11 of 40 
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
This Se~lement Agreement (this 11Agreement") Is made as of Mayii.,, 2014, by 
and among Philip G. Jones {the 11Trustee11) 1 In his capacity as Chapter 7 Trustee of the 
banl<ruptcy estate of Mark Rindlesbaoh (the 11Debtor')1 and The Ruth 8. Hardy 
Revocable Trust, Deleon Corporation Profit Sharing Plan fbo A. Wesley Hardy, Finesse 
P.S.P. 1 MJS Real Properties, LLC, Uintah Investments, LLC, Davfd D. Smith, Steven 
Condie, David L. Johnson, Berrett PSP, VW Professional Homes PSP, Ty Thomas, and 
D.R.P. Management PSP (collectively, the "Hardy Parties"}. The Trustee and the Hardy 
Parties are referred to herein as the 11Partles.11 
BACKGROUND 
Whereas, on September 13, 2013, the Debtor filed a voluntary petition for relief 
under Chapter 11 of title 11 of the United States Code {the ''Bankruptcy Code") in the 
United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah (the "Court"), commencing case 
number 13-30552 (the "Case"); 
Whereas, by Order of the Court dated January 13, 2014, the Case was 
converted to one under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, and the Trustee was 
appointed as the Chapter 7 Trustee of the Debtor's bankruptcy estate {the "Estate"); 
Whereas, currently on deposit with the clerk of the Third Judicial District Court ii:, 
and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, In connectlon with an action entitled Ruth 8. 
Hardy Revocable Trust, et al. vs. Brenda N. Rindlesbach, et al.t Case No. 130900183 
(the 11Salt Lake County Actlon 11 ) are the proceeds of three checks, In the amounts of 
$4001000, $1 17631025 and $3,7001 respectively. The $400,000 check represents a 
portion of the proceeds of the sale of property formerly owned by the Rlndlesbach 
(0019M73,DOC /2} 
Case 13-30552 Doc 358 Filed 07/21/14 Entered 07/21/i416:14:29 Desc Pending 
Order Granting Trustees Motions for Order Approving: (1) Settlemen Page 12 of 40 
Construction Inc. Profit Sharing Plan (the 11PSP") located In Tooele County, Utah (the 
"Tooele Property"). The other two checks represent a portion of the proceeds of 
property located in West Jordan, Utah (the 1West Jordan Propertt), record title to which 
was formerly held by the Rlndlesbach Construction Employees Pension Plan (the 
"Pension Plan"); 
Whereas, a part of the proceeds of the Tooele Property was used lo purchase a 
certificate of deposit at Lake Forest Bank, and the Trustee and the Hardy Parties 
believe that approxlmately $23,507 remains of that certificate of deposit (the 11Lake 
Forest Accoune); 
Whereas, In connection with the Case, the Hardy Parties have previously 
obtained relief from the automatic stay with respect to 5,2328 shares In the West Smith 
Ditch Water Company (the 'Water Stocl<")1 which has been exchanged for banked water 
entitlements for use In Elk Ridge, Utah, and the Hardy Parties are currently Uquldatlng 
the banked water entitlements in cooperation with the Trustee; 
Whereas, the Trustee has been informed that the the Debtor loaned more than 
$500,000 to the PSP before the Petition Date (the "PSP Loan"); 
Whereas, the Hardy Parties assert an unsecured claim against the Estate In an 
amount of $17,524,705.13 {the "Hardy Parties Claim''), comprised of the following 
components: 
A. $7,030,836.74 based on the Hardy Parties' assertion that the Debtor is 
personally liable for the Judgment the Hardy Parties secured in 2012 against the PSP, in 
the case of Ruth B. Hardy Revocable Trust, et al,, vs. Robert A. Jones, et al., Case No. 
080913314 In the Third Judicial District Court In and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah 
(0019147:1.DOC / l} 2 
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Order Granting Trustees Motions for Order Approving; (1) Settlemen Page 13 of 40 
(the "Guaranty Case"), whic~ Is the subject of a pending appeal. to the Utah Court of 
Appeals (the 11Personal Liability Claim");1 
B. A clalm for the value of lhe ~ssets transferred by the PSP or the Pension 
Plan to or for the benefit of the Debtor, f ncludfng the proceeds of the West Jordan 
Property and the Tooele Property, Interest on each transfer at the legal rate and 
attorney fees incurred In seeking avoidance of such transferst which claim Is f n the 
amount of $3,592, 703.24 (the "Fraudulent Transfer Clalm"), which claim Is to be 
reduced by any recovery the Hardy Parties are able to obtain on fraudulent transfer 
claims. $317,533.75 of that amount Is duplicative of the attorney fees included in 
paragraph A above; and 
C. A claim for punitive damages that may be awarded as a result of lhe 
fraudulent transfers described above, In an estimated amount of $5,000,000 (the 
"Punitive Damage Claim"). 
Whereas, the Trustee disputes aspects of the Hardy Parties• Claim 1 and asserts 
that groun.ds may exist to equitably subordinate the Hardy Parties• Claim under 
Bankruptcy Code§ 510{c), and the Hardy Parties deny that there Is any basis for 
equitable subordination of their claims. 
Whereas1 mutually desiring to avoid the burdens, risks and e)(penses of potential 
litigation between themselves, the Parties have entered Into this Agreement to facilitate 
a full and final resolution and settlement of the matters described above and to fully and 
finally resolve and settle any and alt disputes between and among themselves; 
1 This amount Includes estimated attorneys• fees of $533,602,49 In anforcJna the Judgment In addition, If 
the Hardy Partlos' appeal with respect to the 12% finance charge Is successful1 the Hardy Parties assert 
that lha Oeblor's llablllly on this claim would be ~9,249,535,64. 
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Whereas, the Trustee has considered the benefit to the Estate and creditors that 
WIii be received as a result of the settJem~nt of these matters, partJcutarly In light of the 
costs, uncertalntles and risks of further lltlgation, and ttas concluded that the settlement 
contained herein ls (I) fair and _equftable, {Ii) a reasonable resolution of the Parties' 
dlsputes, and (Iii) In the best Interests of the Estate and Its creditors. 
NOW, TH~REFORE, for good and valuable consideration as provided herein, 
the legal sufficiency of which is hereby acknowledged, and intending to be legally bound 
hereby, the Parties agree as follows: 
1. Payment to Estate, The Hardy Parties will request1 or In the case of the 
Lake Forest Account will consent to, payment to the Trustee, ln the aggregate amount 
of $500,000 {the "Se~lement Amountu) to be paid to the Trustee on behalf of the Estate 
on or before August 31 1 2014. For clarity, the Trustee's obUgations under this 
Agreement are contingent upon hfs timely receipt of the portions of the Settlement 
Amount described fn subparagraphs A and C below. The Settlement Amount shall be 
derived from assets of the Profit Sharing Plan, shall constitute the repayment of a 
portion of the PSP Loan, and shall be comprised of the following components: 
A. $400,000 from the proceeds of the Tooele Property; 
B. $23,507 from the Lake Forest Account; and 
C. $76A931 or more as necessary to complete payment to the Trustee 
In the total amount of $6001000, from the proceeds of the banked water 
entitlements derived from the Water Stock. 
2. Allowance and Agreed Reduction of Certain Claims. The Parties agree 
that the Hardy Parties CJalm shall be allowed In the reduced amount of $4,000,000, and 
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shall be subordinated In priority to all other allowed unsecured claims against the Estate 
which are not subordinated unde_r 11 U.S,C, § 5-1 O(c) or otherwise (the 11Subordlnated 
Claim"). Such subordination Is limited to the treatment of the Hardy Parties Claim in the 
Case and such clalm is not subordinated for any other purpose or In any other context 
Except as specifically allowed and subordinated by this paragraph, the Hardy Parties 
Claim shall be disallowed In (ts entirety. The Subordinated Claim shall be allowed in the 
following c~mponent parts, each of which shall constitute a binding obligation of the 
Debtor owed to the Hardy Parties: 
A. The Personal Liability Claim In the amount of $2,610.000.00; 
B. The Fraudulent Transfer Claim in the amount of $1,390,000.00; and 
C. The Punitive Damages Claim in the amount of $0. 
3. Release by Trustee. On the Effective Date, the Trustee, for hlms~l.f and 
on behalf of the Debtor and the Estate (the "Debtor Releasors"), shall and hereby does 
fully, finally and forever release and discharge the Hardy Parties and their 
representatlves, principals and attorneys of and from any and all claims, counterclaims. 
crossclaims, actions, causes of acUon, suits, contracts, covenants, agreements1. 
promises, trespasses, debts, dues, demands, accounts, bonds, bills, notices, 
controversies, obligations, liabilltles, damages, judgments, executions, liens, 
encumbrances, claims for contribution and Indemnity, losses, costs or expenses of any 
nature whatsoever, in law or In equity, known or unknown, suspected or unsuspected, 
asserted or unasserted, fixed or contingent, matured or unmatured, which any of the 
Debtor Releasors at any lime has had, owned or held from the beginning of the world 
through the date of this Agreement against any of the Hardy Parties or any of their 
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representatives, principals or attorneys by reason of any matter1 cause, occurrence, 
fact, thing, aot or omission whatsoever arising out of, based upon, or relating to any 
matter or event whatsoever, past or present (except for any obUgatJons arising under 
this Agreement} (all of the foregoing are hereinafter collectlvely referred to as_ the 
11Debtor Claims"), On and after the Effective Date, the Trust~e hereby Irrevocably 
waives the right to commence, institute or prosecute any lawsuit, action or other 
proceeding against the Hardy Parties or any of their representaUves, principals or 
attorneys relating to, arising from or in connection with the Debtor Clatms. 
4. Release By Hardy Parties In favor of Trustee, On the Effective Date, the 
Hardy Parties shall and hereby do fully, finally and forever release and discharge ·u,e 
Trustee and the Estate, and all attorneys and accountants retained by the Trustee (the 
11Hardy Releasees 11) of and from any and all claims, counterclaims, crossclaims, actions, 
causes of action, suits, contracts, covenants, agreements, promises, trespasses, debts, 
dues, demands, accounts, bonds, bllls, notices, controversies, obligations, Uabilltles, 
damages, judgments, executions, liens, encui,:tbrances, claims for contribution and 
Indemnity, losses, costs or expenses of any nature whatsoever, In law or In equity, 
known or unknown, suspected or unsuspected, asserted or unasserted, fixed or 
contingent, matured or unmatured, which any of the Hardy Parties at any time has had, 
owned or held from the beginning of the world through the date of this Agreement 
against any of the Hardy Releasees by reason of any matter, cause, occurrence, fact, 
thing, act or omission whatsoever arising out of, based upon, or relating to any matter or 
event wh~tsaever, past or present (except for any obligations arising under this 
Agreement and except for the Subordinated Claim) (all of the foregolng are hereinafter 
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collectively referred to as the "Hardy Claims"). On and after the Effective Date, the 
Hardy Parties hereby waive the rlght to commence, Institute or prosecute any lawsuit, 
action or other. pro_ceedlng against the Hardy Releasees relating to, arising from or In 
connection with the Hardy Claims. The Hardy Parties reserve all claims and causes of 
action whatsoever against any party other than the Hardy Releasees. 
5. No Assignment. (a) The Trustee represents and warrants that he has not 
assigned, transferred, encumbered, granted a security Interest In, or conveyed the 
Debtor Claims or any rnterest therein to any person or entity. (b) The Hardy Parties 
represent and warrant that they have not assigned, transferred, encumbered, granted a 
security Interest In, or conveyed the Hardy Claims or any interest therein to any person 
or entity. 
6. Trustee's Administration of the Estate. The Hardy Parties agree and 
consent that the Trustee shall have no obligation to administer assets or seek 
recoveries for the purpose of payment of the Subordinated Clalm except as the same 
may be incidental to the administration of the estate for the benefit of other creditors. 
The Trustee shall have no obligation to file, join as a party, or prosecute any action that 
may be assigned to the Hardy Parties pursuant to this Agreement, but reserves the right 
to do so upon request of the Hardy Parties. The Hardy Parties agree, absent the 
Trustee's consent, not to Join the Trustee as a party to any action that may be assigned 
to the Hardy Parties pursuant to this Agreement. 
7. Assignment of /\ssets, Clalms and Causes of Action to the HaidV Parties. 
Upon the Effective Date, the Trustee shall assign, transfer and convey to the Hardy 
Parties any and all assets of the Estate (Including assets that become or are determined 
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to be property of the Estate after the Effective Date) other than the Settlement Amount 
(the "Estate Assets») and a_ny and all clalms and caus~s of action of or available to the 
Trustee or th~ Estate (the "Estate Claims11), including without limitation any claims and 
causes of action arising out of Chapter 5 of the Bankruptcy Code or under Utah Code 
Anr:i. § 25~6~1 et seq. and any and all rfghts to seek substantive consolidation of any 
other entity wlth the Debtor. Notwithstanding the foregoing, in the event the Hardy 
Parties recover any money solely as a result of the assertion of any of the Estate 
Claims, they agree to pay five percent (5%) of the net amount of such recovery (I.e., net 
of any attorney fees, expert witness fees and other expenses Incurred In prosecuting 
any of the Estate Claims): (a) to the Trustee If this Case remains opens at the Hme of 
the recovery or (b) If this Case has been closed, to the holders of allowed unsecured 
clalms In the Case f n proportion to the allowed amounts of such cf alms to the extent 
such claims have not been paid in full, but the Hardy Parties shall not be required to pay 
more than the allowed amount of any such claim. 
8. Representations and Warranties. (a) The Trustee represents and· 
warrants that he has not assigned, transferred, encumbe_red1 granted a security Interest 
In, or conveyed the Estate Assets or any Interest therein to any person or entity. (b) 
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary In this Agreement and except as provided In 
section 8(a) above, the Estate Assets will be transferred 11as Is/' "where Is/ and "If ls0 In 
all respects; neither the Trustee nor any of his agents, attorneys, or representatives 
have made or makes any warranty or representation whatsoever regarding the Estate 
Claims, or any other matter In any way related to the Estate Claims, Including, but not 
limited to, title to the Estate Clalms, use, vaJue, or any other condition of the Estate 
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Claims. The Hardy Parties agree that they are not relying on and hereby specifically 
waive any claim of liability based on any statement, representation, warranty, promise, 
covenant, or undertaking by the Trustee or any other person representing or purporting 
to represent the Trustee In connection with the transfer of the Estate Claims. BY 
SIGNING BELOW, EXCEPT AS PROVIDED IN SECTION B(a) ABOVE,THE HARDY 
PARTIES EXPRESSLY DISCLAIM ALL REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES, 
EXPRESS, IMPLJED, OR STATUTORY, IN CONNECTION WITH THE TRANSFER OF 
THE ESTATE CLAIMS, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, ANY WARRANTY OF 
MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. 
9. Cooperation. The Trustee and the Hardy Parties agree to cooperate In 
seeking the following relief and executing any additlonal documents that are reasonably 
required to carry out the provisions of this Agreement. The Parties re~ognize that the 
outcome or litigation cannot be guaranteed (hence the failure to obtain any of the 
following relief described In this paragraph shall not constitute a breach of this 
: 
Agreement), and the Parties shall not be required to expend unlimited or unreasonable 
amounts of attorneys' fees to obtain such relief specified or Its reasonable equivalent: 
A. In removed adversary proceedings pending under case numbers 13-2399 
and 13·2400, the Hardy Parties and the Trustee will stlpulate to: {I) an order directing 
the Clerk of the Third District Court to disburse $400,000 from the proceeds of the 
Tooele Property to the Trustee and to disburse the remainder of the funds held In 
connection with either of those procccdlngn to Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler in trust for 
the Hardy Parties and (ii) an order remanding those proceedings to utah state courts. 
Upon remand, the Hardy Parties and the Trustee will llkewlse stipulate to the 
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disbursement of the funds held in e:onnectlon with those proceedings consistent with 
this Agreement (as provided In Section 9.A(I) above). 
B. In connection with the pending appeal by the Hardy Parties from the 
Guaranty Case, the Trustee and the Hardy Parties wlll stfpulate to the entry of a consent 
order by the Cou~ of Appeals reversing the order granting summary judgment In favor 
of the Debtor and remanding ihe case (with the remaining aspects of the appeal being 
dismissed). 
C. Upon remand of the Guaranty Case from the Court of Appeals, the Hardy 
Parties and the Trustee will stipulate to entry of a Judgment against the Debtor In the 
amount of $2,610,000.00 consistent with the terms of this Agreement (provided that 
notwithstanding anything fn this Agreement to the contrary, the stipulated judgment shall 
remain subordinated to all other allowed claims for purposes of the Case). 
D. The Trustee and the Hardy Parties will share between them any 
documents obtained from the Debtor or any third parties (subject to any confidentiality 
obligations the Parties may have) regarding the Debtor's financial affairs. 
In addition, the Party for whose primary benefit the relief above is sought shall.be 
required to perform the work required to seek such relief, but each Party shall be 
responsible for his/Its attorneys fees and costs associated with seeking the relief. 
E. The Hardy Parties shall cooperate with the Trustee In seeking the 
dlsallowance of any clalm against the Estate (other than the Subordinated Claim). 
1 o. Relief from Automatic Stay. The Parties stipulate to an order of the Court 
granting the following relief from the automatic stay, the granting of which r~llef Is a 
condition to this Agreement: 
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A. Modification of th~ automatic stay to allow the prosecution of the claims in 
...... 
the proceedings pending under case numbers 13~2399 and 13 .. 2400, including 
prosecution thereof following remand, for any purpos·e other than collecting money from 
the Estate or the Debtor and lo allow the Third District Court to enter findings of fact and 
conclusions of law In the contempt proceeding for which an evidenUary hearing was 
conducted In August 2013. 
8. Modification of the automatic stay to allow the Utah Court of Appeals to 
take the actlon described In Section 9.B above or any other action it deems appropriate 
In that appeal. 
C. Modification of the automatic stay to allow the entry of the judgment 
described in Section 9.C above. 
D. Modification of the automatic stay to allow the Hardy Parties to pursue any 
previously asserted or other claim for avoldance and recovery of any alleged pre-
pe titlon fraudulent transfer as against the Debtor's wife or any other transferee of the 
Debtor's property, including su_bsequent transferees, and any person for whose benefit 
a transfer was made. 
11. Effective Date. As used In this Agreement, the "Effective Date" shall mean 
the date the Settlement Amount other tha~ the Lake Forest Account Is paid in full to the 
Trustee. 
12. Bankruptcy Court Approval. the Lexon Settlement. and Occurrence of the 
Effective Date. The Parties hereby acknowledged and agree that this Agreement is 
subject to the approval of the Court. If the Court does not approve this Agreement and 
also the companion Settlement Agreement between the Lexon Parties and the Trustee 
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(the "Lexon Agreement'') on or before July 15, 2014, or If the ~ffectlve Date does not 
occur on or before September 30, 2014, the terms and conditions of this Agreement 
shall be null and void, the Parties shall retain all of their respective rights and claims, 
and nothing contained herein shaU be deemed a waiver of any rights or remedies of the 
Parties nor an acknowledgement by any of the Parties as to the respecUve rights and 
claims as provided for herein or otherwise. The Parties reserve the right to extend 
either or both of the dates specified In this section. by mutual consent. 
1"3. Lexon Counterclaims. Effective upon the Effective Date, the Hardy 
Parties assign to the Lexon Parties without warranty or representation any and all 
interest lri any counterclaim of the Debtor or the PSP in the litigation filed by the City of 
Saratoga Springs on October 6, 2011 against the Debtor, the PSP, and the Lexon 
Parties (as defined in the Lexon Agreement}, known as City of Saratoga Springs v. 
Rindlesbach, et al., Clvll No. 110402838, pending in the Fourth Judicial Court for Utah 
County (the "Saratoga Springs Litigation"). The Hardy Parties and the Trustee agree 
not to oppose the motion for relief from st13y that has been filed by the City of Saratoga 
Springs to allow that litigation to proceed to conclusion. 
14. Subfect to Fed. R. Evid. 408. The Parties agree that this Agreement Is 
entitled to the protections of Rule 408 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 
15. No Admission of Liability. The Parties agree that neither the acceptance 
of, nor the performance of any obligations under this Agreement shall constitute or be 
construed as an admission of llablllly or fault by any of the Parties. 
16. Entire Agreement. This Agreement embodies the entire agreement and 
understanding between the Parties with respect to the subject matter hereof and 
(001914'/J.DOC /2} 12 
i 
i. 
I 
I 
I• 
I 
·; i 
I ~ !. : 
11; 
Ii 
. : ' 
! i 
. i 
I 1 
1 i 
I' 
I!· 
I ': 
' 
•./ 
.I 
I 
i '. ; ! 
t I 
I. 
I 
i 
f· 
/-' 
i 
Case·-13--30552· Doc-358· ·Filed- 07/21/14 Entered 07/2-1/14-16~-14~29 Desc-Pending 
Order Granting Trustees Motions for Order Approving: (1) Settlemen Page 23 of 40 
supersedes all prior oral or written agreements and understandings relating to the 
subject m_atter hereof, No statement, representation, warranty, covenant or agreement 
of any kind not expressly set forth In this Agreement shall a·ffect, orb~ used to Interpret, 
change or re.strict, the express terms and provisions of this Agreement. 
17. M~dlficatlons and Amendments. The terms and provisions of th1s 
Agreement may be modified or amended only by a written agreement executed by all 
Parties, 
18. Waivers and Consents. Any term or provision of this Agreement may be 
waived, or consent for the departure therefrom granted1 only by a written document 
executed by the party entitled to the benefit of such term or provision. No such waiver 
or consent shall be deemed to be or shall constitute a waiver or consent with respect to 
any other term or provision of this Agreement. Each such waiver or consent shall be 
effective only In the specific instance and for the purpose for which it was given1· and 
shall not constitute a continuing waiver or consent. 
19. Benefit. All statements. representations, warranties, covenants and 
agreements in this Agreement shall be binding on the Parties and shall inure to the 
benefit of the respective successors and permitted assigns of each party hereto. 
Nothing ln thls Agreement shall be construed to create any rights or obligations except 
among the Parties, and no person or entity shall be regarded as a third-party 
beneficiary of this Agreement. 
20. Governing Law. This Agreemenl and lhe rights and obUgatlons of U1e 
Parties hereunder shall be construed In accordance with and governed by the laws of 
the State of Utah, without giving effect to the conflict of law principles thereof. 
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. 21. Retention of Jurisdiction. The Court shall retain jurisdiction to adjudicate 
any controversy, dispute or claim arising out of or In connection with this Agreement, or 
the breach, termination or valldlty hereof. 
22. Headfnqs and Captions. The headings and captions of the various 
subdivisions of this Agreement are for convenience of reference only and shall in no 
way modify, or affect the meaning or construction of any of the tenns or provisions 
hereof. 
23. No Waiver of Rights, Powers and Remedies. No failure or delay by a 
party hereto In.exercising any right, power or remedy under this Agreement, and no 
course of dealing between the Parties hereto, shall operate as a waiver of any such 
right, power or remedy of the party. No single or partial exercise of any right, power or 
remedy under this Agreement by a party hereto, nor any abandonment or 
discontinuance of actions to enforce any such right, power or remedy, shall preclude 
such party from any other or further exercise thereof or the exercise of any other right, 
power or remedy hereunder. The election of any remedy by a party hereto shall not 
constitute a waiver of the right of such party to pursue other available remedies. No 
notice to or demand on a party not expressly required under this Agreement shall 
entitle the party receiving such notice or demand to any other or further notice or 
demand In similar or other circumstances or constitute a waiver of the rights of the party 
giving such notice or demand to any other or further action In any circumstances 
without such notice or demand. 
24. Counterparts. This Agreement may be executed In one or more 
counterparts, and by different Parties hereto on separate counterparts, each of which 
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shall be deemed an original, but all of which together shall conslltute one and the same 
Instrument. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Parties have signed this Agreement as of the date 
first above wrlllen, 
IUUI Y 14T.1,l)Ot' I~ I 
The Ruth B. Hardy Revocable Trust 
De(con Corporallon Prom Sharing Plan 
Ibo A. Wesley Hardy 
By;_N~~ .tl,,.f'd.'1 
Tllle: •f'wlh~· 
Finesse P,S.P, 
By: ........,===::::_..t.::::J.--.:6--Al~~--
Name: Sh v\"" 
Title: If\.\ st~ ~ 
MJS Real Proper\les, LLC 
By:---------
·Name: 
Tltfe: 
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(00.l9'147J.1)00 / 2} 
Uintah lnve~tm~nts,. LLC 
By: ----.....---~---------:---Name~ 
THI~~ 
Stev!;!ri:'Cbndle,' indMaually 
Davrd. LJ' 4~1.ln~on·t ln.d:iv.1~li511ly 
Berrett P.SP 
By: _...;__;..__ _______ --+----=---
Namer 
Title: 
VW Professlenal Homes· PSP : 
By: . 
Nam13::. 
Title:' 
ly Thpm~s-, lndly°ldiJally 
D.R.P. Managernent·PSP 
By: ----....:..--~-'---Name: 
Title: 
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urntah Investments, LLC 
By:----------
Name: 
Title: 
David L. Johnson, lndMdually 
Berrett PSP 
By: 
Name: 
TIUe~ 
VW Professional Homes PSP 
By: 
Name: 
Title: 
Ty Thomas, lndlvldually 
D.R.P. Management PSP 
By: 
Name: 
Tille: 
(00191473.DOC /2} 16 
le I 
I 
I 
I 
I I 
r: 
I 
t 
@ 
Case 13-30552 Doc 358 Filed 07/21/14 Entered 07/21/1416:14:29 Desc Pending 
Order Granting Trustees Motions for Order Approving: (1) Settlemen Page 30 of 40 
Uintah Investments, LLC 
By:----------
Name: 
TIUe: 
David D. Smllh, indlvldually 
Steven Condie, lndlvldually 
{ 
Borrell PSP 
By:---------
Name: 
Tllfe: 
VW Professional Homes PSP 
By.----------Name: 
Title: 
Ty Thomas, lndlvldually 
D.R.P; Management PSP 
By:----------
Name: 
Title: 
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Uintah Investments, LLC 
By;-----------Name: 
TIUa: 
. David D. Smith, lndlvfdually 
Steven Condie, lndlvidually 
David L. Johnson, fndlvldually 
Ty Thomas, lndMdually 
D.R.P. Management PSP 
By. _________ _ 
Name: 
Title: 
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SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
This Settlement Agreement (th(s ''Agreement") Is made as of May~ 2014. by 
and among Philip G. Jones (the "Trustee"). In his capacity as Chapter 7 Trustee of the 
bankruptcy estate of Mark Rindlesbach (the aDebtor'')1 and Lexon Surety Group, LLC, 
Bond Safeguard Insurance Company, and Lexon Insurance Company (collectively, the 
"Lexon Parties"). 
BACKGROUND 
Whereas, on September 13, 20131 the Debtor flied a voluntary petition for rellef 
under Chapter 11 of title 11 of the United States Code (the ,.Bankruptcy Code") In the 
United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah (the "Court11) 1 commencing case 
number 13w30552 (the 11Case1'); 
Whereas, by Order of the Court dated January 13, 2014, the Case was 
converted to one under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, and the Trustee was 
appointed as the Chapter 7 Trustee of the Debtors bankruptcy estate (the 11Estate"); 
Whereas, lexon has filed Claim No. 15~1 ln the Case, asserting an unsecured 
claim in the amount of $2,097,194.10 (the "Lexon Proof of Claim"); 
Whereas, the Trustee disputes aspects of the Lexon Proof of Claim, and in 
particular aspects of the Lexon Proof of Claim are contingent upon future events, and 
hence portions of the Lexon Proof of Claim may be subject to objection under 
Bankruptcy Code § 502(e). 
Wheieas, mutually desiring lo avoid the burdens, risks and expenses of potential 
. litlgatlon between themselves, the Parties have entered into this Agreement to facllitate 
a full and final resolution and settlement of the matters described above and to fully and 
finally resolve and settle any and all disputes between and among themselves; 
(00191471.DOC/) 
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Whereas, the Trustee has considered the benefit to the Estate and ~redltors that 
will be received as a result of the settlement of these matters, particularly In light of the 
costs, uncertainties and risks of furth~r litigation. and has concluded that the settlement 
contained herein is (1) faJr and equitabJe, (ii) a reasonable resolution of the Parties' 
disputes, (ill) In the best Interests of the the Estate and ifs creditors. 
NOW, THEREFORE, for good and valuable consideration, the receipt and legal 
sufficiency of which Is hereby acknowledged, and intending to be legally bound hereby, 
the Parties agree as follows: 
1. Allowance and Agreed Reduction of Lexon Proof of Claim. The Parties 
agree that the Lexon Proof of Claim shall be allowed In a reduced amount whf ch Is the 
greater of (a) $350,000, or (b) the sum of all allowed claims against the Estate (other 
than the subordinated claim of the Hardy Parties) multiplied by 85%, up to a maximum 
amount of $930,00b (the 11Allowed Claim"). The Lexon Proof of Claim shall be 
disallowed to the extent It exceeds the Allowed Claim. In the event of (i) either (a) a 
Judicial determf nation that the Debtor and the Rlndlesbach Construction Inc. Profit 
Sharing Plan (the "PSP")) are alter egos; or (b) the substantive consolfdatlon of the PSP 
with the Debtor, and (ii) Stone Rfver Falls or any of its affiliates or principals re-files a 
proof of claim, then the remainder of the Lexon Proof of Claim shall not be disallowed, 
subject to further objection by the Trustee. 
2. Release by Trustee. On the Effective Data. the Trustee, for himself and 
on behalf of the Debtor and the Estate (the 11Debtor Refeasors',, shall be deemed to 
have fully, finally and forever released and discharged the Lexon Parties (and their 
respective officers, directors, shareholders, attorneys, agents, successors, and assigns) 
of and from any and all claims, counterclaims, crossclaims, actions, causes of action, 
(<10I9J4'1I.DOC/} 2 
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suits, contracts, covenants, agreements, promises, trespasses, debts, dues, demands, 
accounts, bonds, bills, notices, controversies, obligations, Uabitltles, damages, 
judgments, executions, liens, encumbrances, claims for contribution and Indemnity, 
losses, costs or expenses of any nature whatsoever, in law or in equity, known or 
unknown, suspected or unsuspected, asserted or unasserted, fixed or contingent, 
matured or unmatured, which any of the Debtor Releasers at anytime had, owned or 
held from the beginning of the world through the date of this Agreement against any of 
the Lexon Parties by reason of any matter1 cause, fact, thing, act or omission 
whatsoever arising out of, based upon, or relating to any matter or event whatsoever, 
past or present (except for any obligations arising under this Agreement) {all of the 
foregoing are hereinafter collectlvely referred to as the 0 Debtor Clalms"). On and after 
the Effective Date, the Trustee hereby irrevocably waives the right to commence, 
institute or prosecute any lawsuit, action or other proceeding against the Lexon Parties 
relating to, arising from or in connection with the Debtor Claims or the Case. 
3. Release By Lexon Parties. On the Effective Date1 the Lexon Parties shall 
be deemed to have fully1 finally and forever released and discharged the Trustee and 
the Estate, and all attorneys and accountants retained by the Trustee (the "Lexon 
Releasees") of and from any and all claims. counterclaims, crossclalms, actions, causes 
of action, suits, contracts, covenants, agreements, promises, trespasses, debts, dues1 
demands, accounts, bonds, bills, notices, controversies, obligations, liabllltles, 
damages, Judgments, executions, liens, encumbrances, claims for contribution and 
indemnity, losses, costs or expenses of any nature whatsoever1 in law or in equity, 
lmown or unl<nown, suspected or unsuspected, asserted or unasserted, fixed or 
contingent matured or unmatured. which any of the Lexon Parties at anytime had, 
(00191471.IJOC/) 3 
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owned or held from the beginning of the world through the date of this Agreement 
against any of the Lexon Releasees by reason of any matter, cause, fact, thing, act or 
omission whatsoever (except for any obligatlons arlsfng under this Agreement and the 
Allowed Claim) (all of the foregoing are hereinafter collectively referred to as the "Lexan 
Claims"), On and after the Effective Date, the Lexon Parties hereby waive the right to 
commence, Institute or prosecute any lawsuit, action or other proceeding against the 
Lexon Releasees relating to, arising from or in connection with the Lexon c"laims or the 
Case. Notwithstanding anything In this Agreement to the contrary, the Lexon Parties 
may pursue any affiliate or party related to the Debtor (such as MLR Enterprises, LC.) 
and any property of any such entity to satisfy the outstanding obligations owed to the 
Lexon Parties, Moreover, the Trustee stipulates that the bankruptcy automatic stay 
does not preclude the Lexon Parties from pursuing claims against non-debtor entitles as 
described in the preceding sentence, and the Trustee will stipulate to relief from the 
automatic stay to the extent necessary to permit the Lexon Parties to pursue claims 
against non~debtor entitles. 
4. No Assignment. (a) The Trustee represents and warrants that he has not 
assigned, transferred, encumbered, granted a security Interest In, or conveyed the 
Debtor Clatms to any person or entity. (b) The Lexon Parties represent and warrant 
that they have not assigned, transferred, encumbered, granted a security interest In, or 
conveyed the Lexon Claims to any person or ~ntity. The Lexon Parties further 
represent and covenant (for the benefit of all creditors in the Case) that they will not 
seek substantive consolidation of the PSP with the Debtor or assert any claim that the 
Debtor and the PSP are alter egos. 
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5. Bankruptcy Court Approval. the Hardy Parties Settlement. and Occurrence 
of the Effective Date. The Parties hereby acknowledge~ and agree that thls Agreement 
is subject to the approval of the Court. To the extent that the Court does not approve 
the Agreement and also the companion Settlement Agreement between the Hardy 
Parties and the Trustee {the 11 Hardy Parties Settlement Agree~ent11) on or before July 
15, 20141 or If the Effective Date does not occur on or before September 30, 2014, the 
terms and conditions of this Agreement shall be null and void, the Parties shall retain all 
of their respective rights and claims, and nothing contained herein shall be deemed a 
waiver of any and all rights and remedies of the Parties nor an acknowledgement by 
any of the Parties as to the respective rights and claims as provided for herein or 
otherwise. 
6. Effective Date. As used in this Agreement, the "Effective Date" shall have 
the meaning ascribed that term In the Hardy Parties Settlement Agreement. 
7. Assignment of Certain Claims. On the Effective Dale, the Lexon Parties 
shall assign and transfer to the Trustee, without representation or warranty of any kind, 
all causes of action asserted In· Lexon Surety Group, LLC, et al. v. Brenda Rlndlesbach, 
Case No.130907362, pending in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, 
excepting the Third, Sixth and Seventh Causes of Action, which the Lexon Parties shall 
retain in their entirety, and excepting the Eighth Cause of Action Insofar as It relates to 
Property No. 14 (land in West Valley City tilled In the name of MLR Enterprises, L.C.). 
8. Subiect to Fed. R. Evld. 408. The Parties agree th~t this Agreement is 
entered into pursuant to, and entitled to the pro~ectlons of, Rule 408 of the Federal 
Rules of Evidence. 
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9. No Admission of Liability, The Parties agree that neither the acceptance 
of, nor the performance of any obligations under this Agreement shall constitute or be 
construed as an admission of liabfllty or fault by any of the Parties. 
1 o. Entire Agreement. This Agreement embodies the entire agreement and 
understanding between the Parties with respect to the subject matter hereof and 
supersedes all prior oral or written agreements and understandings relating to the 
subject matter hereof. No statement, representation, warra,,ty, covenant or agreement 
of any kind not expressly set forth In this Agreement shall affect, or be used to f nterpret, 
change or restrict, the ~xpress terms and provisions ·of this Agreement. 
11. Modifications and Amendments. Except as set forth In paragraph 17 
below, the terms and provisions of this Agreement may·be modified or amended only 
by a written agreement executed by all Parties. 
12. Waivers and Consents. The terms and provisions of this Agreement may 
be waived, or consent for the departure therefrom granted, only by a written document 
executed by the party entitled to the benefits of such terms or provisions. No such 
waiver or consent shall be deemed to be or shall constitute a waiver or consent with 
respect to any other terms or provisions of this Agreement. Each such waiver or 
consent shall be effective only in the specific instance and for the purpose for which It 
was given, and shall not constitute a continulng waiver or consent. 
13. Benefit. All statements, representations, warranties, covenants and 
agreements in this Agreement shall be b(ndlng on the Parties and shall Inure to the 
benefit of the respective successors and permitted assigns of each party hereto. 
Nothing In this Agreement shall be construed to create any rights or obligations except 
{00191471.DOC /) 6 
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among the Parties, and no person or entity shall be regarded as a third-party 
beneficiary of this Agreement. 
14. Governing Law, This Agreement and the rights and oblfgatlons of the 
Parties hereunder shall be construed in accordance with and governed by the law of 
the State of Utah1 without giving effect to the conflict of law prfnclpfes thereof. 
15. Retention of Jurisdiction. The Court shall retain exclusive Jurisdiction to 
adjudicate any controversy, dispute or clafm arising out of or In connection with this 
Agreement, or the breach, termination or validity hereof. 
16. Headings and Captions. The heading~ and captions of the various 
subdivisions of this Agreement are for convenience of reference only and shall In no 
way modify, or affect the meaning or construction of any of the terms or provisions 
hereof. · 
17. No Waiver of Rights, Powers and Remedies. No failure or delay by a 
party hereto In exercising any right, power or remedy under this Agreement, and no 
course of dealing between the Parties hereto, shall operate as a waiver of any such 
right, power or remedy of the party, No single or partial exercise of any right, power or 
remedy under this Agreement by a party hereto, nor any abandonment or 
discontinuance of actions to enforce any such right, power or remedy, shall preclude 
such party from any other or further exercise thereof or the exercise of any other right, 
power or remedy hereunder. The electron of any remedy by a party hereto shall not 
constitute a waiver of the right of such party to pursue other available remedies. No 
notice to or demand. on a party not expressly required under this Agreement shall 
entitle the party receiving such notice or demand to any other or further notice or 
demand In similar or other circumstances or constitute a waiver of the rights of the party 
(0Ol9147l,1JOC /) 7 
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giving such notice or demand to any other or further action Jn any circumstances 
, 
without such notice o.r demand, 
1 a. Countemarts. This Agreement may be executed In one or more 
counterp~rts, end by different Parties hereto on separate counterparts, each ofwhfoh 
shall be deemed an orfgfnal, but all of whtc_h together shall constitute one and the same 
Instrument. 
(N WITNESS WHEREOF, the Parties have signed thls Agreement as of 
the date first above wrftlen. 
IOIJl91471,00C/l 
Lexon Surety C3roup, LLC 
dlAJ • /) . 0 ,,1/J A iJ 
By: ~~ • 
Name: Mlchael Belinski 
Tille: CollecUons Atiomey 
Bond Safeguard Insurance Company 
By:~~• 
Name: Michael Ballnskl 
Title: CoUeoUons Attorney 
Lexon Insurance Company 
By. ~,J ~Jl. 
8 
Name: MJohael Bell·nskl 
TU!e: Colleotf ons Attorney 
EXHIBIT 3 
Transcript of July 2, 2014 Hearing Before the 
Honorable Judge Joel T. Marker, United States 
Bankruptcy Court, District of Utah, 
Case No. 13-30552 
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I°N THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 
DISTRICT OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF: 
MARK LEE RINDLESBACH, 
Debtor. 
13-30552 (dig) 
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A P P E A R A N C E S 
FOR THE HARDY 
TRUST, ET AL. : 
FOR RINDLESBACH: 
FOR LEXON SURETY 
GROUP: 
FOR THE TRUSTEE: 
FOR BENNETT TUELLER 
AND RINDLESBACH 
CONSTRUCTION PROFIT 
SHARING PLAN: 
JAMES SWINDLER 
Attorney at Law 
P_AUL TOSCANO 
PETER GUYON 
Attorneys at Law 
DAVID PINKSTON 
Attorney at Law 
SNOW CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
9 Exchange Place 
11th Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
GEORGE HOFMANN 
Attorney at Law 
JAMES K. TRACY 
Attorney at Law 
BENNETT TUELLER JOHNSON & DEERE 
3165 Millrock Drive 
Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84121-5027 
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I N D E X 
Witness: Philip Jones 
Direct Examination by Mr. Hofmann. 
Cross-Examination by Mr. Toscano . 
Witness: James Swindler 
Direct Examination by Mr. Hofmann. 
Cross-Examination by Mr. Toscano. 
Witness: James Tracy 
Direct Examination by Mr. Toscano ... 
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deadline of December 16th, .2013. The conversion 
order to a Chapter 7 was docketed on January 13th, 
2014, and the Chapter 7 deadline for 523 and 727 
objections was April 28th, 2014. 
The trustee has received several 
extensions, Docket Numbers 173, 261, and 303. We 
reviewed those. Those are specifically limited to a 
727 action by the trustee~ so -- so, Mr. Toscano, I'm 
speaking for your benefit. I know some of the 
concerns you have about what's going on here is, "How 
is this going to impact my client after this?" 
As I view it, the Hardy parties have no 
assuming Mr. Rindlesbach gets a discharge -- the 
trustee doesn't file a 727 or the trustee does and 
doesn't prevail -- the Hardy parties have no claim 
against him, and --
MR. HOFMANN: Have a claim, it would be 
discharged. 
THE COURT: Correct. 
MR. HOFMANN: The settlement's approved. 
THE COURT: I agree with that. If the 
settlement's approved, then he gets a general 
discharge .. The Hardy parties cannot, for example, 
file a 523 action at this point. They are -- that 
claim is barred. So I want to make sure you 
RENEE L. STACY, CSR, Rl?R 
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understand that's what I believe has happened in this 
case thus far, and that might address some of the 
concerns you have about what the heck is going on 
here and what's going to happen if the settlement is 
approved. 
I had some of the same concerns, so I hope 
we flesh this out as we go along. 
But then the other issues, Mr. Hofmann, I 
want you to explain to me are paragraphs 9(b) and (c) 
and 10 (a) . What are the effect of those provisions, 
what are the purpose, and especially on lO(a), the 
contempt proceeding, which, as I reviewed again 
Mr. Rindlesbach's objection, he didn't even say 
anything about that, but I don-' t know why it 1 s there, 
and I'm concerned about it, so --
MR. HOFMANN: Well --
THE COURT: So -- you don't need to respond 
now. 
MR. HOFMANN: Sure. 
THE COURT: I'm just -- you can, if you 
want to make an opening, go through those things, but 
that's something I need addressed. I just wanted to 
mention it up front so that we didn't miss it and 
have to go back through it again afterwards, all 
right? 
RENEE L. STACY, CSR, RPR 
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MR. HOFMANN: Understood. 
THE COURT: All right. Anything else? All 
right. Mr. Hofmann, please proceed. 
MR. HOFMANN: Let me first ask if our --
the colloquy we just had adequately addressed your 
concerns about the statement that you highlight, 
"each of which shall constitute a binding obligation 
that the debtor owed to the Hardy parties." I think 
I -- you understand the trustee's position on that, 
that if 
THE COURT: I don't, so please explain it. 
MR. HOFMANN: Okay. So the trustee's 
belief is that -- assume that -- for a moment the 
trustee does not file a 727 cause of action against 
the debtor, which is entirely possible. If that's 
the case, the debtor would receive a general 
discharge. If the Court approves the settlement in 
that fact scenario, the debtor would have the 
obligation that the trustee had agr~ed to, but that 
obligation would be discharged, and so action could 
not be taken, obviously, in violation of the 
discharge injunction. 
Does that satisfy the Court on that 
particular point? 
THE COURT: Well, at some point, whether 
RENEE L. STACY, CSR, RPR 
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Notice of Discharge 
Case 13-30552 Doc 367 
Form RAB18 (Official Form 18)(10/05) 
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Certificate of Notice Page 1 of 7 
United States Bankruptcy Court 
District of Utah 
Case No. 13-30552 
Chapter 7 
Desc Imaged 
In re: Debtor(s) (name(s) used by the debtor(s) in the last 8 years, including married, maiden, trade, and address): 
Mark Lee Rindlesbach 
2489 East Haven Lane 
Salt Lake City, UT 84117 
Social Security No.: 
xxx-xx-4068 
Employer's Tax I.D. No.: 
Petition date: 9/13/13 
DISCHARGE OF DEBTOR(S) 
It appearing that the debtor(s) is entitled to a discharge, 
IT IS ORDERED: 
The debtor(s) is granted a discharge under section 727 of title 11, United States Code, (the Bankruptcy Code). 
BY THE COURT 
Dated: 7/30/14 Joel T. Marker 
United States Bankruptcy Judge 
SEE THE BACK OF THIS ORDER FOR IMPORTANT INFORMATION. 
